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In 1997, the California courts denied parental status to two women
who had lived with and helped raise their partners' children for a
number of years.' In contrast, in 1998, the Supreme Court of California
awarded parental status to the husband of a woman who had become
pregnant while separated from him and living with a lover.2 In all three
cases the individuals seeking parental status were non-biological parents.
The California courts, following the lead of the federal courts,
strongly support the position that the differential treatment of men and
women, based solely or primarily on gendered constructions of
Susan E. Dalton earned a Ph.D. in Sociology at the University of California, Santa
Barbara. She currently holds the position of Assistant Researcher in the Department
of Clinical Pharmacy at the University of California, San Francisco. Professor Dalton
teaches courses in Sexuality and Law, Gender and Law, the Sociology of Lesbian and
Gay Communities, and Women in Western Societies.
1. In re Guardianship of Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); West v.
Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
2. Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1998).
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masculinity and femininity, is legally impermissible.' An exception does
exist, however, (in both State and Federal law) in the area of human
reproduction. When considering laws and policies in this area, the
courts do occasionally support procedures that appear facially
discriminatory so long as they are used to redress disadvantages that may
arise as the result of the physical changes that occur during and
immediately following pregnancy. Laws that require employers to
provide maternity leave, to rehire employees following such leave, and
to provide private areas for breast feeding or milk extraction are
examples.' So, despite a general rule of equal treatment, the courts do
recognize that, during and immediately following reproduction, men
and women are biologically different from one another, and the law is
generally allowed to recognize and reflect those differences.6
But what is the difference between men and women who are in-
volved in acts of social reproduction?7 Do the California courts treat
non-biological, i.e. "social" mothers differently than non-biological, i.e.
"social" fathers? If so, should this treatment be legally permissible?8 As
the cases above suggest, the courts frequently grant legal parent status to
3. Most cases involve discrimination in the workforce, falling under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. % 2000e-2000e-17 (2000), or discrimination
in education, falling under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
4. For current discussions regarding the courts' treatment of pregnancy as a "special
case" with regard to application of the principal of equality between the sexes, see
Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, in FOUNDATIONS:
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 180 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993); Linda J. Krieger &
Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action
and the Meaning of Women s Equality, in FOUNDATIONS: FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
156 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy
and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, in FOUNDATIONS: FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY 128 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
5. Many of these laws (e.g., a limited period of employment leave following the birth or
adoption of a child) are being rewritten in a gender-neutral fashion allowing both
men and women to take advantage of them. Some, however, like providing women
private facilities for breast-feeding, are likely to remain sex-based.
6. Throughout this analysis I use the term "sex" (as in "sex differences") as a biological
referent. The biological fact that women gestate fetuses and men produce sperm is a
sex difference. I use the term "gender" (as in "gender discrimination") as a social ref-
erent. The social assignment of parental roles to men and women (breadwinner
versus caretaker, or disciplinarian versus nurturer, for example) are gender differences.
7. Here, I am using the term social reproduction, in contrast to biological reproduction.
I mean to emphasize the parenting of children to whom one is not biologically re-
lated.
8. After all, the physical manifestations of pregnancy, the current legal justification for
disparate treatment, does not exist here as neither group of parents experiences them.
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non-biological fathers while refusing similar status to non-biological
mothers.9 Is this practice logically and inevitably grounded in the bio-
logical differences inherent in male and female reproduction, as the
courts frequently claim, or is it merely a complex case of sex-based dis-
crimination?
In today's world, the courts encounter a dizzying array of new re-
productive possibilities and family constellations-often, the result of
advances in reproductive technology, combined with changes in social
understandings of what constitutes a family-that create previously un-
imagined paths to parenthood. 0 These fast-moving developments
challenge the courts to think in new ways about what constitutes a par-
ent and/or a family and make the following analysis particularly
important to debates addressing issues of equality and differences in re-
production.
To anticipate the forthcoming analysis, I find that the California
courts, bound as they are to traditional constructions of reproduction
and family, continue to construe all fathers (both biological and social)
as fundamentally different from all mothers (whether biological or so-
cial). A long tradition of employing a presumption of biological
consanguinity (albeit very loosely construed) in parental status cases has
tied the courts to particular constructions of parent and family that are
unnecessarily restricted by sex (parenting pairs, for example, remain re-
stricted to one male and one female only). This remains true despite the
fact that creative uses of reproductive technology and the social emer-
gence of new family forms frequently make the courts' constructions of
parent and family woefully inaccurate and inadequate. Through an
analysis of California family law statutes and parental status cases
(stemming from 1872 to 1998), I will demonstrate that the California
courts continue to construct parenthood as a gendered status by uncriti-
cally, unnecessarily, and inappropriately using biological reproduction
as the model against which all social parents are judged.
9. See Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1998); In re Guardianship of
Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); West v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 1 am specifically leaving aside the issue of paren-
tal status obtained through adoption. In the cases examined here, none of the social
parents legally adopt the children they are parenting.
10. Lesbian- and gay-headed two-parent families and families created through contract
surrogacy are a few examples. Today it is not unreasonable that five separate indi-
viduals might claim parental status based on their intimate involvement in a
reproductive scenario. These individuals might include a sperm donor, an egg donor,
a gestational surrogate, and a contracting couple who initiate and pay for the repro-
ductive event in the hopes of creating a child that they can raise as their own.
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Although this analysis pertains specifically to California law, it is
broadly applicable. Numerous states maintain laws similar to those dis-
cussed below and many courts, both State and Federal, reach
comparable decisions employing similar reasoning.1 Indeed, in many
areas, including the ones discussed here, the California courts find
themselves "out in front" and their decisions frequently influence the
reasoning employed by courts in other states.
If we believe, as the courts have previously asserted, that it is im-
permissible to treat women differently than men simply because
tradition and/or history appears to demand it, then we must begin to
challenge ongoing disparities in the judicial treatment of non-biological
mothers and fathers. As the analysis below will demonstrate, men and
women can and do frequently carry out acts of social parenting in ways
that are strikingly similar to one another. The courts' failure to recog-
nize these similarities, hidden as they are underneath an artificially
imposed model of biological difference, results in a fundamental breach
in the guarantee of equal treatment.
In Part I of this article, I briefly review the way legal scholars com-
monly define sex-based discrimination, particularly as it pertains to
issues of reproduction. Part II is a brief historical review of legal con-
structions of parenthood. In Part III, I examine two legal concepts:
retroactive legitimation and presumed fatherhood. Both concepts were
introduced in 1872 and each independently encouraged judges to think
of fatherhood as consisting of two distinct spheres, the biological and
the social. I then trace the legal development of these concepts through
a series of presumed father, retroactive legitimation, and putative father
cases. In Part IV I extend the analysis to include legal constructions of
11. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 248-49 (1983) (holding that where the
putative father had never established a substantial relationship with his child, the fail-
ure to give him notice of pending adoption proceedings did not deny the putative
father due process or equal protection since he could have guaranteed that he would
receive notice by mailing a postcard to the putative father registry); Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380, 380 (1979) (dealing with a holding by New York's highest
court that a New York Domestic Relations Law's sex-based distinction between un-
married mothers and unmarried fathers did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
(the United States Supreme Court eventually overturned the State Court's decision
and held the statute unconstitutional)); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 246-47
(1979) (finding that a Georgia statute denying the father of an illegitimate child the
authority to prevent the adoption of the child by the husband of the child's mother
did not violate the Constitution); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972)
(holding that due process and equal protection laws entitled unwed fathers to a hear-
ing on fitness accorded to all other parents whose custody of their children is
challenged).
[Vol. 9:261
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motherhood by introducing lesbian co-mother and female surrogacy
cases into the mix. This allows me to directly compare legal construc-
tions of motherhood to legal constructions of fatherhood. In Part V I
discuss gendered aspects of the legal institution of marriage and the
complicated role marriage plays in legal constructions of parenthood. In
Part VI I delve into several recent lesbian co-mother and surrogacy cases
to explore how some judges are attempting to expand legal construc-
tions of motherhood in ways that would bring them more on par with
legal constructions of fatherhood. And finally, in Part VII, I offer final
remarks and conclude that judges' inability to conceive of a gender neu-
tral subject, at least when considering issues related to human
reproduction, creates serious legal disadvantages for virtually all women.
As the analysis below makes clear, the resulting discrimination is
grounded in gendered constructions of parenthood and not, as many
courts conclude, in the biological differences between men and women.
I. DEFINING SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION
Feminist scholars have long argued that legal constructions of both
spouse and parent are deeply influenced by social constructions of gen-
der.' 2 Traditionally, the courts have understood husbands and fathers as
12. For a wide-ranging series of discussions regarding women's historical relationships to
the family, the labor market, and parenthood, see generally PHILIPPE ARIhs, CENTU-
RIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE (Robert Baldick trans.,
1962); KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAw (1985); DEBORAH
RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVO-
LUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal Fic-
tion of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century America, in HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES: DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND LAW 132 (Nancy F. Cott ed., 1992);
Teresa Brennan & Carole Pateman, Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth: Women
and the Origins of Liberalism, 27 POL. STUD. 183 (1979); Carol Brown, Mothers, Fa-
thers, and Children: From Private to Public Patriarchy, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION:
A DISCUSSION OF THE UNHAPPY MARRIAGE OF MARXISM AND FEMINISM 239 (Lydia
Sargent ed., 1981); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850,
in HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES: DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND LAw 153
(Nancy F. Cott ed., 1992); Michael Grossberg, Who Gets the Child? Custody, Guardi-
anship, and the Rise of a Judicial Patriarchy in Nineteenth-Century America, in
HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES: DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND LAw 286
(Nancy F. Cott ed., 1992); Heide Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and
Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION: A DIS-
CUSSION OF THE UNHAPPY MARRIAGE OF MARXISM AND FEMINISM 1 (Lydia Sargent
ed., 1981).
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distinctly different from wives and mothers. While historically the
courts' gendering of these familial roles has been explicit-as when
women and children were deemed the property of husbands/fathers-
over the last 30 years the courts have attempted to move in the direction
of gender-neutrality. 3 Displaying this shift toward gender neutrality,
courts today frequently take the position that "sex based generalizations
are generally impermissible whether derived from physical differences
such as size and strength, from cultural role assignments such as bread-
winner or homemaker, or from some combination of innate and
ascribed characteristics, such as the greater longevity of the average
woman compared to the average man.""
However, as Hillary Allen argues, despite a fairly determined move
toward the development of gender neutral laws and practices, the goal
of gender neutrality is ultimately unachievable so long as the courts re-
main incapable of imagining a gender-free subject.'5 This is especially
true in the area of human reproduction where gender differences fre-
quently develop directly from the physical manifestations of pregnancy.
As many feminists acknowledge, reproduction represents a special
case, an instance in which women are indisputably different than men.
As Herma Kay notes, "[w]hen the specific question is raised about what
equality between women and men might mean, the debate focuses on a
particular set of differences: the biological differences that define the
two classes of male and female."16
Generally, the legislature has resolved the issue of sex-based differ-
ences that arise during and immediately following pregnancy by
supporting policies and procedures that are designed to neutralize the
negative social consequences many women suffer as a result of the
physical manifestations of pregnancy.17 As noted above, while some of
13. See Kay, supra note 4, at 36-43; Nadine Taub & Wendy Williams, Will Equality
Require More Than Assimilation, Accommodation, or Separation from the Existing So-
cial Structure at 55-58, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 48, 49 (Patricia Smith ed.,
1993); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality at 255-60, in FOUNDA-
TIONS: FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 251-53 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993). The authors
argue for different models of gender equality.
14. Williams, supra note 4, at 130.
15. HILLARY ALLEN, JUSTICE UNBALANCED: GENDER, PSYCHIATRY AND JUDICIAL DECI-
SIONS 121 (1987).
16. Kay, supra note 4, at 181.
17. The 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982), amended
Title VII to provide that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, and related
medical conditions shall be treated the same as other persons not so affected but simi-
lar in their ability or inability to work."
[Vol. 9:261
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these policies and procedures may be facially discriminatory-often be-
cause they are made applicable to women but not men-in practice,
when they are used to counter the social and economic costs of preg-
nancy, they have generally been deemed permissible. 8 Generally
speaking, while sex-based policies and procedures are impermissible in
most circumstances, they are legal when designed and utilized specifi-
cally to reduce the social and economic costs of pregnancy and
childbirth for women.
As Kay argues, the only time men and women should be situated
differently under the law is when they are engaged in biological repro-
ductive behavior." At all other times, and under all other circumstances,
the existence of policies or procedures that make a person's sex factually
relevant, in a way that bestows either advantage or disadvantage upon
members of one group or the other, violates the very notion of sex-based
equality under the law.2°
II. GROUNDING PARENTHOOD IN BIOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION
A. Natural Law and Legal Constructions of Parenthood
Historically, family law in the U.S. was derived using the natural
law assumption that the right of individuals to raise their biological off-
spring exists independently of any governmental law or regulation.2'
This right, it is claimed, is pre-political, a condition "the law presup-
poses rather than creates." 2 Under this assumption, judges have
declared that, "Unless parents are left free to raise their own children,
the entire social fabric will be destroyed: 'man' will be 'denaturalized,'
the instincts of humanity stifled, and one of the strongest incentives to
18. See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 272-73
(1987)(finding that a California law requiring employers to reinstate women after a
reasonable pregnancy disability leave did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978).
19. Kay, supra note 4, at 36.
20. The law does, however, occasionally allow for sex-based discrimination to occur in
the military, such as when men are drafted and deployed in combat units while
women are not.
21. See generally ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS
OF PARENTING (1993).
22. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA L. REV. 879,
887-88 (1984) (citation omitted).
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the propagation and continuance of the human race destroyed.,
23
Through statements of this sort, judges have historically grounded legal
constructions of parenthood in consanguinity.
It is important to note, however, that in practice the putative natu-
ral rights of biological parents have often been abrogated. Examples
include state laws that have denied these rights to slaves,24 court deci-
sions that have either denied or restricted the child custody rights of
lesbian and gay parents, 25 and the enforcement of presumed parent stat-
utes. 26 Despite the existence of both statutory law and legal precedent
that clearly unhinges legal parent status from biological reproduction,
many jurists vigorously resist attempts to displace the biological narra-
tive underlying traditional legal constructions of parenthood.27
B. Early Constructions ofMother and Father
Much of the legal framework guiding the development of family
law in the United States was originally imported from the British system
and then altered according to the interests and concerns of the legisla-
tures of individual states. One modification that occurred in California
regarded the British laws governing legitimacy. An examination of Brit-
ish laws throughout the seventeenth century shows that children's
legitimacy status was originally inseparable from the marital status of
their parents.2 As Kay explains, under British law, children born outside
of wedlock were considered irreparably illegitimate. 29 These children,
23. Id. at 888.
24. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM:
A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 53-161 (6th ed., 1988) (regarding the lack of pa-
rental rights of blacks under slavery).
25. For examples of courts imposing restrictions on the custody and visitation rights of
lesbian and gay parents, see, for example, S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987); In reJ. S. & C., 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) aJd,
362 A.2d 54 (N.J. App. Div. 1976); In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct.
1976). But see In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 291 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that a restraining order prohibiting a gay father's visitation with his
son was unreasonable).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 35-52.
27. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56-57 (Haw. 1993)(arguing Natural Law,
when considering principles of privacy, liberty, and justice, to refute requests by les-
bian and gay couples to obtain marriage licenses).
28. Herma Hill Kay, The Family and Kinship Systems of Illegitimate Children in Califor-
nia, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST SPECIAL PUBL. ON ETHNOGRAPHY L. 57, 58-59
(1965).
29. Id. at 58-59.
[Vol. 9:261
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alternately considered "the child of nobody" and "the child of every-
body," lacked a legal connection to either of their biological parents.0
Their parents in turn had no legal duty to support them." It is worth
noting that just because a child was born illegitimate did not mean that
his or her parents necessarily abandoned it. Indeed, one or both parents
frequently cared for illegitimate children until they reached adulthood.
It does, however, demonstrate that under seventeenth century British
law the legal construction of parenthood was gender neutral, as legal
recognition of either the mother or the father depended upon marriage.
The nature of these illegitimacy laws, Kay argues, began changing
in the mid-eighteenth century as governmental officials, interested in
securing some care and protection for illegitimate children, began le-
gally tying them to their biological mothers for the first seven years of
life.32 Some years later officials further strengthened this legal relation-
ship by extending the number of years mothers were legally responsible
for their illegitimate children from seven to sixteen.3 In this way the
legal definition of parent became gendered. Mothers became women
who biologically reproduced children whereas fathers remained men
who biologically reproduced children solely within the institution of
marriage.
III. CALIFORNIA'S AGGRESSIVE DECOUPLING OF FATHERHOOD
FROM BIOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION
A. Presumptive Fatherhood
In 1872, California legislators, wishing to strengthen the State's
support for marital families and soften the negative effects of illegiti-
macy on children, passed a pair of laws. The first, a presumed father
statute, awarded father status to fertile married men who were living
with their wives at the time their wives became pregnant. The second, a
retroactive legitimation statute, allowed men to retroactively legitimate
children born outside of marriage by accepting their illegitimate chil-
dren into their homes and treating them as if they were legitimate.
Together these laws further broadened existing legal constructions of
30. Id. at 59.
31. Id. at 58-59.
32. Id. at 59.
33. Id.
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fatherhood by allowing judges to attach father status to men who were
already connected to children either biologically or socially.
The legislature's actions were undoubtedly driven, at least in part,
by the economic empowerment of men relative to women that existed
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As numerous scholars
have noted, women living in early American society experienced both
legal and economic subordination that largely prevented them from ac-
cessing or acquiring wealth independent of their relationships with
men.' This legislative action gave judges the ability to legally tie chil-
dren who would otherwise be deemed fatherless, and thus illegitimate
and penniless, to men.
The first of these laws, the Presumed Father Statute35 established
that whenever a child is "conceived during a time when the mother [is]
living in the same house with her husband ... and the husband is not
impotent ... the child is conclusively presumed to be legitimate. ,,36
Following are two presumed father cases, the first from 1902 and the
second from 1998. As these cases demonstrate, interpretations and ap-
plications of the statute have changed very little since its inception.
Mills: The California Supreme Court case In re Mills's Estate37 pro-
vides an example of how the Presumed Father Statute was originally
interpreted and used by the courts. Application of the statute allowed
the courts to award custody and control of married women's children to
their husbands, helping to insulate marital families and protect the legal
stature of husbands within those families. In Mills, a married woman,
Diana Chatham, approached the court seeking to have her deceased
paramour declared the legal father of her children so that they could
inherit from his estate. In court Mrs. Chatham testified that:
[B]efore either of the [children in question] were begotten, she
ceased to occupy the room with her husband, and ... never
had sexual intercourse with him after that time...
[T]hereafter [she] slept with Robert Mills in a bedroom in the
home of herself and husband, and ... her husband knew that
34. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 12, at 9; Basch, supra note 12, at 141; Brown, supra note
12, at 242-43; Chused, supra note 12, at 206-17; Hartmann, supra note 12, at 20-
23. The authors argue that women in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were
largely excluded from the public realm, including most lucrative entrepreneurial posi-
tions and governmental posts.
35. The Presumed Father Statute, CAL. Clv. CODE § 193 (Deering 1996), was first en-
acted in California in 1872.
36. Kay, supra note 28, at 61.
37. 70 P. 91 (Cal. 1902).
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Mills was habitually having sexual intercourse with her ...
[Furthermore, she testified] her husband knew that Mills was
the father of [her children] .8
Despite this testimony, the court declared that Mr. Chatham was
the legal father of his wife's children.39 It concluded that although he
might not be their biological father, he was not absent from the home at
the time they were conceived, no evidence was presented proving him to
be impotent or sterile, and he had accepted the children into his home
and treated them as his own.40
As this decision makes clear, social fathering, when performed
within state sanctioned families, is more important to the legal defini-
tion of fatherhood then mere biological reproduction. As Janet Dolgin
notes, while biological reproduction is key to the legal definition of
motherhood, the key factor in legal determinations of fatherhood is a
man's relationship to the biological mother.4' Indeed, in presumed fa-
ther cases, the social relationship a man has with a woman, as
determined through marriage and his relationship with her children,
may completely override the fact of biological paternity.
Dawn D.: The California Supreme Court case Dawn D. v. Superior
Court" is recounted to demonstrate the extent to which the California
courts are willing to elevate the State's interest in the marital family
above the interests of biological fathers. In this case, the California Su-
preme Court refused an alleged biological father's attempt to secure a
blood test that could have been used to conclusively determine pater-
nity.
The biological mother, Dawn, separated from her husband Frank
and began living with her boyfriend Jerry. Soon thereafter Dawn be-
came pregnant. Upon discovering that she was pregnant, Dawn left
Jerry and returned to Frank. After learning of Dawn's pregnancy, Jerry
approached the court seeking recognition as the child's biological/legal
father.
Both the superior and appellate courts agreed with Jerry, ordering
Dawn and the child to submit to blood tests in an effort to determine
biological paternity. The California Supreme Court, however, reversed,
38. Id. at 92.
39. Id. at 94.
40. Id. at 92.
41. Janet Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REv.
637, 650-60 (1993).
42. 952 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1998).
20031
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arguing that the law in California "may be applied to preclude an al-
leged biological father from establishing his paternity of a child born
during the mother's marriage to another man." 43 The court concluded
that "[t]he husband in this case is presumed to be the child's natural
father, as the child was born during the marriage.",
44
As Dolgin notes, while "the law ... understands the family to in-
clude a biological aspect and a social aspect, '45 it is clear that when the
social interest of maintaining the marital family is weighed against the
interests of biological fathers to maintain relationships with their chil-
dren, the former trumps the latter. Eric G. Andersen adds that the
courts also weigh the child's interest in having its mother's husband rec-
ognized as its legal father.46 Decisions such as this insure that social and
legal fatherhood resides in the man who is also the head of the child's
family.47 Used in this way, the Presumed Father Statute blurs the
boundaries between biological and social fatherhood by encouraging
judges to substitute the biological fact of reproduction with a very
loosely construed presumption of that fact for some married men.
The construction of the law, however, specifically its requisite pre-
sumption of consanguinity and its restricted application to married
men, allows the courts to simultaneously unbind biological reproduc-
tion from the legal construction of fatherhood, all the while denying
41that they are doing so. While presumed father determinations are pur-
portedly based on an inference about biological fact, they are actually
little more than judicial prescriptions about marriage and family. As
Marjorie Maguire Shultz notes, "[t]he important issue becomes not who
is, but who should be having sex with the mother: her husband."4' This
legal slight-of-hand is extremely important because it allows judges to
apply the law without undermining the natural law assertion that bio-
logical consanguinity remains fundamental to the legal construction of
parent.' ° That the substitution of social fathers for biological fathers is
43. Jd. at 1140.
44. Id.
45. Dolgin, supra note 41, at 642.
46. Eric G. Andersen, Children, Parents, and Nonparents: Protected Interests and Legal
Standards, 3 BYU L. REV. 935, 939-41 (1998).
47. Id. at 960-69.
48. By restricting application to married men, the statute invokes the unspoken assump-
tion that these men have exclusive and ongoing sexual relations with their wives.
49. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood An
Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 2 Wis. L. REV. 297, 317 (1990).
50. As will be discussed later in the paper, judges frequently use this assertion to fend off
parental claims made by non-biological mothers. See infra Part IV.
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masked with the claim that because the husband could have impreg-
nated his wife it is proper to assume that he did impregnate her, does
nothing to change the fact that the law creates a non-biologically-based
definition of natural fatherhood.
Finally, the statute works to preserve traditional notions about men
and their relationship to families, i.e., women and children. As Dolgin
argues, it is traditionally marriage (the conscious formation of a legally
recognizable family) and not biological reproduction that has been the
door to parental status for men. The social relationships men develop
and maintain with women through marriage act as the legal conduit for
the relationships men form with children-whether their own biological
offspring or simply the offspring of their wives." While biological re-
production does offer men an opportunity to develop a relationship
with their children, it provides no guarantee that such a relationship will
be legally recognized and/or supported. Men's biological paternity, or
the lack thereof, counts remarkably little in their attempts to form le-
gally recognizable parental relationships with the children of married
women.52 This fact, as we will see below, makes legal definitions of fa-
therhood remarkably different than legal definitions of motherhood.
B. Retroactive Legitimation
In 1872, along with the passage of the Presumed Father Statute,
California legislators passed the Retroactive Legitimation Statute.53 As
with the Presumed Father Statute, this legislation was enacted to help ease
the deleterious effects of illegitimacy on children. This law established the
means by which unmarried biological fathers could legitimate their
51. See Dolgin, supra note 41, at 648-49 (arguing that the courts apply this model even
in cases where the man seeking parental status is unquestionably known to be the
biological father). If the man does not have a well-established relationship with his
child's mother, the courts are unlikely to grant his request for legal father status. The
exception is when denying a biological father parental status will render a child fa-
therless. When faced with potentially fatherless children, judges frequently recognize
the parental rights of biological fathers, even when doing so goes against the wishes of
the child's birth mother. See, eg., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986).
52. Since marital status trumps biological status for men, married men may gain parental
status regardless of their biological connection to their wives' children, and single
men who impregnate married women lose parental status regardless of their biological
connection to their paramours' children.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 230 (Deering 1960) (repealed 1975).
20031
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
children retroactively-at some point after a child's birth-through a
procedure known as "conduct" legitimation. According to the Act:
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging
it as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife,
if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if
it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such; and such a
child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of its birth 4
In 1874, the legislature added that any "child born before wedlock
becomes legitimate by the subsequent marriage of its parents.,
5
On its face, this Retroactive Legitimation Statute appears to con-
tradict the logic supporting the Presumed Father Statute, i.e., that men's
relationships with children be filtered through their relationships with
the mothers of those children. In practice, however, the courts' applica-
tion of the Retroactive Legitimation Statute does not directly challenge
this reasoning. While retroactive legitimation did allow judges to cir-
cumvent the heretofore requisite marital relationship between fathers
and mothers, as the cases below demonstrate, the law encouraged judges
to take this step only when otherwise legitimate father figures (hus-
bands) were absent from the equation. Thus, the courts did not use the
statute to undermine already existing marital families, but rather used it
as a way of providing fathers for children whose only other option was
illegitimacy. Indeed, so long as these decisions were rendered in the
shadow of the Presumed Father Statute any threat they might pose to
the sanctity of the marital family was neatly circumvented.
Retroactive legitimation is important to this analysis because its
application neatly divides the legal construction of fatherhood into dis-
tinct components; the social and the biological. While allowing some
unwed fathers access to parental status does appear to bring the legal
construction of fatherhood more on par with the legal construction of
motherhood (i.e., both men and women who reproduce outside of mar-
riage can now be deemed legal parents), the two constructions remain
far from equivalent. While females continue to gain parental status via
the act of biological reproduction, parental status for men continues to
attach in large part to their social parenting behaviors.
54. Id.
55. Id
56. But see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (rejecting the father's status based on the
performance of social reproductive behaviors in cases involving the naturalization of
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Indeed, what retroactive legitimation actually accomplishes is a
broadening of the pool of behavior judges may use to justify attaching
fathers to otherwise illegitimate children. The law, on its face, appears to
broaden the legal construction of fatherhood only slightly (i.e., to in-
clude unwed biological fathers who maintain a father-like relationship
with their children). But, as the cases below reveal, judicial manipula-
tions of the social reproductive behaviors required under the law lead to
a much more expansive outcome. As this analysis reveals, by the 1960s,
judges had set aside virtually all of the social parenting requirements
contained within the law allowing them to focus almost exclusively on
biological consanguinity. 7 Of extreme importance, however, is the
method used to set these requirements aside. Although all of the judges
appeared willing to seriously compromise the validity of one or another
of the requirements individually, none expressed the opinion that social
components of fatherhood should be altogether removed from the equa-
tion. Thus, social parenting remains a critical component of legal
constructions of fatherhood even as it takes on an extremely nebulous
character.
Blythe: The California Supreme Court in Blythe v. Ayres,5" for ex-
ample, retroactively legitimated a child even though that child had never
been received into her father's home as the statute requires. In this case,
Mr. Blythe, an unmarried man and the alleged biological father, met
and engaged in sexual relations with the child's mother during a short
trip to England. Following this brief interlude Mr. Blythe returned to
California never to travel outside the United States again. His daughter,
born and raised in England, did not travel to America until after her
father's death; indeed, she testified in court that she had never actually
met the man.
The court, in deciding to grant the young woman retroactive le-
gitimacy, made note of the fact that Mr. Blythe "declared the plaintiff
to be his child to all persons upon all occasions.... acknowledged the
child to its mother and to its grandmother before it was born ... and
individuals born outside the United States to mothers who are not American citi-
zens). This case does, however, strongly support the argument being made here that
the legal construction of parenthood is gendered.
57. This trend continued such that by the 1990s, the courts were willing to grant father
status based on little more than a blood test genetically linking an alleged father to his
child (usually for the purpose of allowing the state to collect child support payments
from the alleged father). See Dolgin, supra note 41, at 645.
58. 31 P. 915 (Cal. 1892).
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[even requested] that [she be] named and baptized Florence Blythe."59
The court noted that Mr. Blythe resided "in lodging houses" with his
mistress and that he was not legally married.60 It then neatly circum-
vented the requirement that fathers accept their children into their
homes by finding that Mr. Blythe, as a single man, had no home or
family into which he could receive his child. Declaring that section of
the statute unenforceable, the court proceeded to grant the daughter
retroactive legitimacy.
While the court was willing to set aside a portion of the statute that
Mr. Blythe clearly could not meet, it rigorously attended to the remain-
ing social parenting requirements. Thus, the court's decision to
invalidate an individual recuirement can in no way be read as an indica-
tion that it considered social parenting unimportant to legal
constructions of fatherhood.
McNamara: In Estate of McNamara,6 the California Supreme
Court again addressed the issue of what constitutes a family into which
a man must accept his child before retroactive legitimation can be be-
stowed. In this case, the court was presented with a married woman
(Mrs. Bettencorte) who left her husband to live with her lover (Mr.
McNamara) with whom she eventually begot and bore a child.62 The
child, while born to a married woman, was illegitimate because its
mother was not living with her husband at the time of its birth.
The court reasoned that, while "[t]he relation between McNamara
and Mrs. Bettencorte was, to be sure, unlawful .... this does not nega-
tive [sic] the plain fact that the family relation existed."63 In addition,
the court argued that, ".... in signing the child's birth certificate [and]
describing himself as the father"64 McNamara had fulfilled all of the ob-
ligations required under the law to retroactively legitimate the child.65
59. Id. at 922.
60. Id. at 923.
61. 183 P. 552 (Cal. 1919).
62. Id. at 554.
63. Id. at 558.
64. Id.
65. In Laugenour v. Fogg, 120 P.2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942), the court puts an interest-
ing twist on the gender politics active in McNamara by finding against a married man
who had left his wife and taken up residence with his lover who eventually bore his
child. In Laugenour, the court determined that a married man is unable to create a
family with anyone other than his wife. As his family consisted of himself and his
wife, and he had never invited his child into that family, the court determined that he
had not fulfilled the requirements of California Civil Code Section 230 and thus
could not be declared the legal father of his mistress' child. Id. at 692.
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In this case, instead of setting aside a piece of the statute as the
Blythe court chose to do, the court modified the definition of family so
as to include the father, his mistress and her child. While Mrs. Betten-
corte was married to someone other than Mr. McNamara (presumably
preventing her from being part of a family consisting of herself,
McNamara and their child) the courts could not easily assign father
status to her husband (using the Presumed Father Statute) because she
was not living with him at the time the child was born. Thus, the court
did what it could by awarding father status to Mr. McNamara (the man
with whom the mother and child had developed a family-like relation-
ship) rather than leave the child fatherless.
The court bent the legal definition of family to accommodate the
situation before it. By doing so, it was able to grant an otherwise ille-
gitimate child legitimacy. At the same time it strengthened the
developing position that biological fathers who act like fathers-i.e.,
form family-like relationships with the mothers of their children-
should be granted legal father status. Thus, while this decision may have
rendered the legal definition of family somewhat negotiable, it, like the
decision in Blythe, accentuated the courts' commitment to the social
reproductive component of the legal definition of fatherhood.
Lund: In In re Lund's Estate,66 the California Supreme Court was
faced with a retroactive legitimation request posed by a young man who
did not begin living with his father until well after the age of eighteen
and who had never lived with his father in the state of California. This
case raised serious questions about the meaning of accepting a child into
one's home and family.
67
In Lund the court determined that:
Andrew Lund sent to Norway for his son Bert Lund, not for a
person designated as the illegitimate child of Caroline
Anderson. It was Bert Lund, the acknowledged son of Andrew,
who traversed the long route from Norway, on the high seas of
the world, across the Atlantic Ocean, through half of the
United States, to the family home in Minnesota. There, in
compliance with the second requirement of the California
statute, and further evidencing compliance with the first, Bert
was received into the family with the full consent of both
Andrew and his wife Agnes. From then on, conforming to the
66. 159 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1945).
67. Id. at 646.
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third specification of the statute, Bert was treated as if he were
a legitimate child ... 68
Here, the court reads the term child to mean offspring-rather
than one who has not yet reached the age of majority-by focusing on
the relationship between the father and his son rather than on the son as
an individual. By focusing on the relationship rather than on the indi-
vidual, the court identifies the son as a perpetual child, thereby allowing
it to extend the time frame in which the statute remains applicable in-
definitely. Bert did not migrate to the United States until after reaching
adulthood. Yet, when he moved into his father's home and family, he
did so as a child-a child who required the courts assistance in shrug-
ging off the hardships of illegitimacy. As in the two previous cases, the
court manipulated a single aspect of the statute just enough to allow it
to cover the idiosyncrasies of the case before it.
Wilson: In In re Wilson's Estate," California's court of appeals was
asked to clarify what behavior is necessary to fulfill the requirement that
a father treat his child "as if it were legitimate." At the heart of this case
is the question, what do fathers normally do with their children?
Here, the court is faced with a father who, by all accounts, has
spent little more than a couple of afternoons in the presence of his child.
The court record reveals that on one visit, "the baby remained [with its
mother in the father's home] from about noon to dusk, slept on the
couch and was played with by the [father] and [the child's paternal
grandmother]. 70 On an almost identical visit one year later, "the father
[did] such natural things as fondling the child and holding her in his
arms and playing with her."7
In this decision, the court describes the simple act of holding and
fondling a child (even if only for a very short period of time) as "natu-
ral" parenting behavior. According to Dolgin, the courts often use the
term natural to invoke an image of nature itself-a way of being that is
good, decent, and occasionally even inevitable. 72 By identifying the fa-
ther's admittedly limited interactions with the child as "natural," the
court raises the significance of the acts, making them appear far more
important than they might otherwise be. This allows the court to then
favorably compare the man's admittedly limited behavior to the behav-
68. Id. at 655.
69. 330 P.2d 452 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
70. Id. at 453.
71. Id. at 454.
72. Dolgin, supra note 41, at 668.
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ior of legitimate fathers (read, husbands living in legally sanctioned
families with their wives and children).
It is worth noting, however, that this reasoning is purely tautologi-
cal. The court labels the father's behavior "natural" based entirely on his
biological connection to the child. First, it is biological consanguinity
that makes the behavior special, and then it is the special nature of the
behavior that allows the court to recognize the fact of biological consan-
guinity.
By this point the courts have seriously pared down virtually all of
the social parenting requirements contained within the Retroactive
Legitimation Statute.73 Indeed, it appears that as long as a biological
father openly acknowledges his paternity and interacts with his
child(ren) on some level (not necessarily in person), and for some period
of time (an afternoon or two will do), the courts will award him legal
father status provided there is no husband also seeking that status.
Lavell: In a final retroactive legitimation case, Lavell v. Adoption In-
stitute,74 the court of appeals effectively eviscerated what remained of the
Retroactive Legitimation Statute. In this case, Frederick Lavell ap-
proached the courts seeking recognition as the legal father of a child
born to a woman to whom he was not married, and with whom he no
longer lived. The child's mother had placed the child for adoption
against Lavell's wishes and without his consent. The issue of the child's
legitimacy was important because in 1960, the year the case was heard,
both parents of a legitimate child had to consent to its adoption while
the mother of an illegitimate child was permitted to make that decision
unilaterally.75
At the time, the only way the courts could grant parental status to
unmarried fathers was through retroactive legitimation. This action was
complicated, however, by the fact that the child's mother had left the
father's home several weeks prior to giving birth and the father had
never actually met or interacted with the child.76
The court held that:
[T]he unborn child of unwed parents is an existing person ...
and we believe is ... capable of being received into the family
of the father .... The child must be treated as if it were
73. The one social requirement that remains untouched is the public acknowledgment of
paternity.
74. 8 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
75. Id. at 368.
76. Id.
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legitimate, but this requirement may not be construed as
applying only to a child after its birth.77
In this case, the court substitutes "unborn child" for "child" in the
language of the statute, allowing it to extend the statute's applicability
backward in time, seemingly to the point of conception. It then deter-
mined that the mere act of living with the fetus's mother and
acknowledging oneself to the fetus's genitor successfully fulfilled all of
the social fathering requirements contained within the statute. In effect,
the court swept aside all of the social parenting requirements contained
within the statute, and based its determination of legitimation on bio-
logical consanguinity alone.
Like the Presumed Father Statute, the Retroactive Legitimation
Statute encouraged judges to split the definition of fatherhood into two
distinct spheres: the biological and the social. One unique aspect of the
Retroactive Legitimation Statute, however, was that it provided a venue
for judges to practice manipulating the social aspect of fatherhood.
While biological paternity remained relatively stable, social fatherhood
became extremely malleable. Judges began picking and choosing be-
tween various aspects of social fatherhood, replacing one with another
seemingly at will and even refashioning them when necessary. Indeed,
by the 1960s, the courts had modified the components of the statute to
such an extent that the only social behavior still required was an ac-
knowledgment of paternity. 78 By choosing to manipulate these
requirements, instead of simply disregarding them altogether, however,
the courts left intact the legislature's split definition of fatherhood while
expanding considerably their control over its applicability.
While we can only guess at the motivation driving these judges to
manipulate the social aspect of fatherhood in this way, it is useful to
note that in all of the cases discussed above (with the exception of Lay-
el), the courts were asked to award father status posthumously. The
requests came from the children themselves and there is no evidence
that any of their mothers objected. Indeed, these awards of father status
had no apparent social costs. They were unbound from questions of
custody (with the exception of Lavell, yet even there the mother had
already relinquished custody herself) and allowed judges to distribute
the fathers' estates to their biological child(ren). The judges in all of the
77. Id. at 370.
78. Recall, however, that the courts only grant paternity to unmarried men who repro-
duce children with women who are not legally attached to and living with husbands.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-40, 42-44.
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above cases had to decide between awarding parental status to biological
fathers or leaving children legally fatherless.
In a similar vein, retroactive legitimation never threatened either
the primacy of the mother/child relationship or the existence of already
established nuclear families. Although Lavell appears to be an exception,
in that case the mother had already abandoned her position as parent by
relinquishing the child for adoption. Thus, the court was free to award
parental status to the father without challenging the primacy of the
mother-child bond; indeed, the issue before the court in Lavell was rec-
ognizing the biological father or rendering the child legally parentless.
As for protecting already existing nuclear families, the statute clearly
stated that a father had to invite his child into his home with the per-
mission of his wife if he had one.7 9 This caveat presumably gave existing
wives some power to prevent their husbands' illegitimate children from
undermining the inheritance rights of their legitimate children if they so
desired.
Finally, this broadening of the application of the Retroactive
Legitimation Statute appears to have reduced the disparity between the
legal constructions of fatherhood and those of motherhood. The
parental rights of unmarried biological fathers become more similar to
those granted unmarried biological mothers.80
As the next series of cases demonstrates, however, throughout the
1970s and 1980s the gap between legal constructions of motherhood
and legal constructions of fatherhood begins to widen again. By cou-
pling the language of the Presumed Father Statue with the newly
malleable definitions of social fatherhood produced through the retroac-
tive legitimation cases above, the courts create new social routes to
parenthood for men that remain largely unavailable to women.
C Putative Fatherhood
In 1973, the California legislature melded the concept of presumed
fatherhood with aspects of retroactive legitimation within the Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA). Once married, adults in California fall under the
jurisdiction of the UPA. This law is designed to facilitate the creation of
79. See supra text accompanying note 54.
80. The exception, of course, remains where single men and women reproduce with
married partners. While a single woman who reproduces with a married man retains
her parental status, a single man who reproduces with a married woman remains at
risk of losing his parental status to his partner's husband.
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legal relationships between married adults and children who are either
born or adopted into the family. According to the UPA:
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if...
(a) He and the child's natural mother are or have been mar-
ried to each other and the child is born during the marriage,
or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated ....
(b) Before the child's birth, he and the child's natural
mother have attempted to marry each other by a marriage sol-
emnized in apparent compliance with law ..
(c) After the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother
have married, or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage
solemnized in apparent compliance with law ... and either of
the following is true:
(1) With his consent, he is named as the child's father on
the child's birth certificate.
(2) He is obligated to support the child under a written
voluntary promise or by court order.
(d) He receives the child into his home and openly holds
out the child as his natural child.
82
Clearly, the UPA creates conditions under which men can become
legal fathers, usually, but not always, by replacing biological reproduc-
tion (the physical act of becoming a father) with marriage (a social
commitment to assume the role of father should the opportunity pre-
sent itself within the confines of the marriage). However, in some cases,
such as under section (d) of the UPA, men can become legal fathers
simply by receiving children into their homes and representing them-
selves as biological fathers.
There is no evidence that the legislature, in creating either pre-
sumed fatherhood or retroactive legitimation, consciously intended to
81. The legal rights of non-biological fathers over children born to their presumed wives
remain intact even if their marriage is later determined to be technically not legal.
CAL. FAM. CODE 7611 (West 1996).
82. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 1996).
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alter the legal construction of natural fatherhood from a single category
consisting of both social and biological reproduction to discrete catego-
ries of biological consanguinity and social reproduction. Indeed, the
evidence suggests that the legislature made a conscious attempt to main-
tain biological consanguinity as a key component of the legal definition
of natural fatherhood. As the cases below reveal, however, the courts'
increasingly creative manipulations of the legal definition of father-
hood-always in the service of securing legal fathers for otherwise
fatherless children-eventually led to the creation of a new definition of
natural fatherhood," one that is completely void of biological consan-
* - 83
guinity.
Valle: In the appellate case In re Marriage of Valle,84 a woman,
Lucinda Valle, sued her husband Manuel for child support following
the breakdown of their marriage. Lucinda and Manuel, though married,
had no biological children of their own. Following a brief visit to Mex-
ico in 1966, they reentered the United States with Manuel's five-year-
old nephew and one-year-old niece using false birth certificates that
identified the two adults as the children's biological mother and father.
From that point forward, according to court records, "the children re-
garded [them] as their natural parents, and [they] likewise considered
and treated the children as their own.,
8 5
In this case, the court invoked the legal framework of equitable es-
toppel, a doctrine borrowed from commercial law.86 According to the
court:
Under well settled California law four elements must be
presented in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel:
(1) the party to be estopped must be appraised of the facts;
(2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon or
must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to
believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be
83. For an interesting discussion of the social and legal forces that combine to unhinge
legal constructions of family from their traditional domestic anchor and open space
for the introduction of new (often market/contractual based) representations of famil-
ial relationships, see Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to
Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1994).
84. 126 Cal. Rptr. 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
85. Id. at 40.
86. Equitable estoppel is defined as "[t]he effect of voluntary conduct of a party whereby
he is precluded from asserting rights against another who has justifiably relied upon
such conduct and changed his position so that he will suffer injury if the former is al-
lowed to repudiate the conduct." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 483 (5th ed. 1979).
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ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon
the conduct to his injury. 7
The court then argued that the doctrine could be used to confer
parental status, stating simply: "While pronounced and applied primar-
ily within the context of commercial transactions, the elements of
estoppel have equal application to establish the relationship between a
child and his putative father."" The court concluded that estoppel is a
condition that "runs in favor of the child, not the spouse., 89 In other
words, it is not the husband who is estopped from abandoning his wife,
but rather the father who is estopped from abandoning his children.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as it was applied here, drew
heavily from precedent set in earlier presumed father and retroactive
legitimation cases. As commonly occurs in presumed father cases, the
customarily important biological relationship between the alleged father
(in this case Manuel) and the children (his niece and nephew) was re-
placed by the putative father's familial status. After failing to establish a
direct biological connection between Manuel and the children, the
court shifted their attention to Manuel's marital status (his relationship
to the children as filtered through his relationship with their putative
mother), and declared that to be sufficient grounds upon which to as-
sign parental status.
Note, however, that Manuel was never married to the children's
biological/legal mother; she continued to reside in Mexico. Manuel was
married to the children's social mother, a woman with no legal standing
herself.9 This appears to preclude the court's use of the UPA to grant
Manuel father status. To solve this problem, the court temporarily
abandoned family law and used commercial law instead. While equita-
ble estoppel allowed the court to maneuver around restrictions inherent
in the UPA, the court carefully crafted its decision using the same dis-
course about husbands and families that family court justices had been
using for years.
87. Valle, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id. (citation omitted).
90. Although it appears as though the court, in granting Manuel father status, must also
simultaneously grant Lucinda mother status, thus opening a social route to parental
status for women, the issue of Lucinda's parental status was never before the court.
Because the court never directly addressed Lucinda's parental status, the case may not
be used as precedent by other social mothers seeking parental status. See In re Mar-
riage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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As in more traditional presumed father cases, the fact of biological
consanguinity was replaced with a very loosely construed presumption
of that fact, albeit a slightly different presumption than heretofore in-
voked in presumed father cases. In this case, the presumption of
biological fatherhood was established through the perception of the
children, not the court. In essence, the court argued, as long as a man
plays the role of father convincingly enough to cause the children to
conflate his act of social reproduction with biological reproduction, the
court may assign him legal father status.
In order to shift the presumption in this way, the courts focused
exclusively on the social aspects of Manuel's fathering. Knowing full
well that Manuel was not the children's biological father, the court fo-
cused instead on the fact that Manuel had, nevertheless, invited the
children into his home, held himself out as their father, and treated
them as if they were legitimate. The court in effect determined that
Manuel had retroactively legitimated a pair of children who were not his
biological offspring. Put a slightly different way, the court used
Manuel's marital status to grant him presumed father status, all the
while ignoring the fact that the woman to whom he was married was
not the children's biological or legal mother. Whichever you prefer, the
outcome was to financially tie Manuel to children for whom he had
done little more than voluntarily assume a fathering role.
Johnson: In the appellate case In re Marriage of Johnson,9' Patricia
Johnson sued her former husband, Andrew, for the ongoing support of
her son Jimmy, a child born before her marriage to Andrew and bio-
logically unrelated to him. The court again invoked the terms of
equitable estoppel to reason that Andrew fit the definition of a "puta-
tive" father. The court reasoned that:
Andrew assumed the role of Jimmy's father from the very
moment of Jimmy's birth and continued to play that role for
Jimmy's entire life. Jimmy has known Andrew only as his fa-
ther and has known no other in that capacity. Although
Andrew apparently never expressly represented to Jimmy that
he was his father, it is patently clear that his conduct was such
that an implied representation to that effect was made and
91. 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
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that Andrew intended Jimmy to accept and act upon such rep-
92resentation.
Here, the court again used aspects of both presumed fatherhood
and retroactive legitimation to legally connect a non-biological father to
a child living within his family. And again, the court used the marital
relationship between the husband and the child's mother as the conduit
for that connection. As in Valle, the court modified the traditional pre-
sumption of fatherhood by focusing on what the child presumably
believed. Likewise, the result was to further remove biological consan-
guinity from the equation, allowing the court to award father status
based entirely on a husband's father-like behavior.
Again, employing the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the court
strengthens the notion that the legal definition of fatherhood includes
men who are neither biological nor adoptive parents, but who nonethe-
less accept children into their families and rear them as their own. This
broadening of the legal construction of fatherhood was accomplished
through a modification of the presumption of biological consanguinity
originally introduced in the Presumed Father Statute, which was then
coupled with the social aspects of fatherhood as constructed through
retroactive legitimation. Traditionally, men whose wives have borne
children have been assigned father status. Now, men who marry women
with young children and married men who, with their wives, accept
young children into their homes and act as fathers towards them, may
be assigned father status as well. The preceding case law demonstrates
that the legal construction of fatherhood has been significantly altered
from what it was 150 years ago, with the most striking change being
that biological consanguinity is no longer an obligatory component of
the legal construction of "natural" fatherhood. This does not, however,
mean that judges have completely abandoned traditional notions of par-
enthood or that anyone who acts like a parent will be recognized as such
by the courts.
Indeed, the courts' use of the marital relationship as the conduit for
parental status, when coupled with a requisite presumption of biological
consanguinity (even one that is very loosely construed), seriously
restricts the field of social parents to whom the practice is applicable.
The marriage requirement, for example, restricts application to
traditional male/female pairs. The necessity of a presumption of
biological consanguinity, on the other hand, gives the courts
92. Id. at 123-24.
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considerable control in determining exactly when and to whom parental
status will be assigned.
Halpern: In In re Marriage of Halpern, 3 the appellate court applied
a boundary of sorts to the ever broadening construction of fatherhood as
a way of granting a biological mother's request to block her husband's
attempt to secure post-divorce visitation with her biological child. In
this case, the child's mother, Gale, discovered that she was pregnant
shortly after she began living with her soon-to-be husband Paul. Al-
though Gale informed Paul that he was not the child's biological father,
Paul consented to marry Gale and raise the child as his own. Through-
out the pregnancy Paul acted as Gale's Lamaze coach; he was present in
the delivery room, he listed himself as the father on the child's birth cer-
tificate, and he remained home to care for the child after Gale returned
to work. 4 Eleven months after the child's birth, however, Gale and Paul
separated. Paul visited the child five or six times in the month following
their separation until Gale informed him that "the child was having dif-
ficulties" and unilaterally stopped the visits.95
The court determined that Paul was not a de facto parent and that
"there is no estoppel of any kind ... in favor of Paul with respect to
visitation. ''16 To maneuver around precedent set in Valle and Johnson,
this court determined that the child, at eleven months of age, "was not
old enough to recognize a father or to know what a father is."" This
lack of recognition, the court reasoned, undermined the all-important
presumption of biological consanguinity. Without a presumption, the
court concluded, there existed no grounds upon which to grant Paul
father status.
It is of no small consequence that the court was aware of Gale's
plans to remarry and that she intended her new husband to become the
child's social and legal father. Tipping its hat to this new arrangement
the court concluded, "[b]ecause of [the child's] age ... she would get
over any disturbance very quickly if the assumed new stepfather took
,,98
over.
In this case, the court declined to grant an existing social father
(Paul) parental status, reasoning that the all-important presumption of
93. 184 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
94. Paul, a writer, agreed to work from the couple's home, allowing him to care for the
child during the day. Id. at 742.
95. Id. at 743.
96. Id. at 749.
97. Id. at 743.
98. Id.
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biological consanguinity was unavailable because no one believed it to
be true. The court did determine that Paul had performed fatherhood in
compliance with the standards established in Valle and Johnson (i.e., he
was a married man who had accepted a child into his family, declared
himself its father, and treated it as if it were his own). It concluded,
however, that the relatively short duration of the marriage, coupled with
the immaturity of the child, undermined his claim to parental status.
It is not unreasonable to conclude in this case that the mother's en-
gagement to another man influenced the court's conceptualization of
the child's family structure. Unlike in previous cases where the alterna-
tive had been. fatherlessness, the issue in this case was not whether the
child would have a father, but rather who that father should be. Here,
the court simply reasoned that the most appropriate father, when nei-
ther of the available options is the child's biological father, is that person
who can most closely approximate the normative standard of father-
hood. Although the court did not go so far as to declare Gale's fiance
her child's legal father, its ruling did clear the way for that transition to
occur.
This decision raises important questions regarding the courts' will-
ingness to assign father status to a non-biological father over its
biological mother's objections. Although it is impossible to know, it is
reasonable to assume that the court would have ruled differently if Gale
had requested that Paul be declared the child's father. Had Gale made
this request, there would have been no incentive for the court to find a
way around Valle and Johnson and the issue of whether or not the child
actually believed Paul to be her father would not have arisen.
Although it is tempting to conclude from Halpern that the courts
intend the presumption of fatherhood to be bound-on both ends-by
the age and knowledge of the children involved,99 the evidence does not
generally support this conclusion. While the Halpern court did use the
child's lack of presumption to justify its decision, the court in Valle
failed to raise this issue even though the elder child was five years old
when he moved into the Valle family. This evidence suggests that the
Halpern court, like those before it, considered the legal construction of
fatherhood to be somewhat malleable. Indeed, the decision in Halpern
illustrates judges' apparent willingness to sacrifice strict legal construc-
tions of fatherhood in favor of more traditional constructions of family.
99. Courts faced with children who are either very young when a marriage disintegrates
or older than three or four years when the father/child relationship is established
would lack a reliable presumption of biological consanguinity.
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By the time Halpern was decided, it was clear that the courts were
willing to attach parental status to non-biological fathers under a limited
set of conditions. These conditions include a minimal presumption of
biological consanguinity, a marital union, and a desire on the part of the
child's mother (usually its biological mother, but occasionally its social
mother)100 to have her husband declared a legal father.
This development of putative father status represents an important
advancement in the ability of the courts to tie otherwise fatherless chil-
dren to men presumably able to secure their financial well being. As a
result, mothers gain considerable power to unilaterally determine the
nature of any post-divorce relationship that will exist between their hus-
bands and their children. When mothers express a need for post-divorce
financial assistance in the form of child support, the courts generally
respond by espousing the importance of the father/child relationship
and then using that relationship as justification for legally tying the fa-
ther to the children.' 1 On the other hand, when mothers choose to
forgo this future support, especially if there is a replacement father wait-
ing in the wings, the courts generally downplay the importance of the
father/child bond, thereby justifying a decision to deny the former hus-
band parental status.'02
As Dolgin argues, judicial decisions in paternity cases like these
share a set of tacit assumptions. ' 3 First, the mother-child relationship is
always seen as primary. 0 4 The father-child relationships (whether based
in biology or not) are always secondary.' 5 This means that if there is a
conflict between mothers and fathers regarding child custody matters, a
mother's assertion regarding the needs of the child(ren) will almost al-
ways trump a father's assertion of parental rights. Second, women's
biological ties to children are seen as largely inseparable from their social
ties to children.0 6 Biological mothers, in the courts' view, are naturally
compelled to behave as social mothers. 107 On the other hand, men's bio-
logical ties to children are seen as largely irrelevant to their social ties to
children. 1°'
100. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 84, 91 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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This split between biological and social parenting for men has cre-
ated an ideological space that is absolutely crucial to the courts'
broadening of the legal definition of fatherhood beyond biological re-
production. In this ideological space between biological and social
parenting, legal fatherhood has become a medley of parenting behav-
iors-some biological and some social-that may be freely mixed and
matched so long as certain parameters are maintained. These parameters
help contain the innovative potential of this mix-and-match design by
grounding the results in traditional notions of family.
In addition to tacit assumptions about parenthood, these decisions
rely upon and continually re-inscribe tacit assumptions about family.
For example, the courts continually assume that marriage is the only
appropriate venue for family construction and that nature imposes
restrictions on the configuration of the parenting dyad-restricting it by
size as well as by sex.109 As I will demonstrate below, these assumptions
severely limit judges' ability to broaden legal constructions of
109. In June of 2002, the California Supreme Court broadened the parameters of pre-
sumed fatherhood yet again by dropping the marriage requirement altogether. See In
re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002). In this case, Thomas (the presumed father)
sued for custody of his ex-girlfriend's son Nicholas. While Nicholas' biological
mother, Kimberly, strenuously objected to Thomas' attempts to gain custody of
Nicholas, she was effectively removed from the case when she was declared unfit to
parent Nicholas herself. Id. at 934-35. While the court determined that Thomas was
not Nicholas' biological father, it reasoned that no biological father had been identi-
fied, leaving Nicholas potentially parentless. Id. at 933-34. Rather than render
Nicholas parentless, the court held that while claims of presumptive fatherhood are
rebuttable using evidence (such as that obtained through DNA testing or testimony
by the presumed father to the effect that he is not the biological father) that success-
fully undermines the presumption of biological consanguinity upon which such cases
are often based, in this case, any evidence undermining the claim of presumptive fa-
therhood (such as a lack of marriage between the presumptive father and the child's
biological mother combined with evidence that the presumptive father is not the bio-
logical father) is to be considered irrelevant. Id. at 933-34. In its conclusion, the
court found:
Section 7612(a) provides that "a presumption under Section 7611 [that a
man is the natural father of a child] is a rebuttable presumption affecting
the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by
clear and convincing evidence." When it used the limiting phrase an ap-
propriate action, the Legislature is unlikely to have had in mind an action
like this-an action in which no other man claims parental rights to the
child, an action in which rebuttal of the section 7611 (d) presumption will
render the child fatherless. (emphasis added)
Id. at 941. Note, however, that even this maneuver maintains the naturalization of
the male/female parenting dyad as the court first determines that there is no other
recognizable father available before awarding Thomas parental status.
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motherhood akin to what we have just seen regarding legal
constructions of fatherhood.
IV. LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD
Although the courts in the 1970s-1980s gave biological mothers
the power to unilaterally determine the post-divorce relationships be-
tween their former husbands and their children, this trend appears to
have run contrary to the joint custody movement that was also gaining
popularity in California during this time. According to Lenore Weitz-
man, changes in the social structure of the family as well as changing
expectations of women's roles both inside and outside the family, facili-
tated an increase in judicial preference for joint custody awards."0 The
social forces driving this shift included increasing numbers of women
(including young mothers) working outside the home,"' a fairly wide-
spread belief in the restructuring of labor (including child-related labor)
inside the home,"1 2 and a recognition that children generally benefit
from maintaining post-divorce relationships with both of their par-
ents. "' As more women became financially self-sufficient and more men
became, theoretically involved in the day-to-day care of their children,
many medical practitioners, invoking the "best interest of the child
standard," arued for the widespread application of joint-custody ar-
rangements.
Given these changing conditions, some judges undoubtedly be-
came uncomfortable with the practice of allowing biological mothers
unfettered power to determine the nature of the post-divorce relation-
ships between their ex-husbands and their children. Nonetheless, in
110. WEITZMAN, supra note 12, at 231.
111. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLU-
TION AT HOME 2 (1989); Harriet B. Presser, Shift Work and Child Care among Young
Dual-Earner American Parents, 50 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAMILY 133, 133 (1988).
112. See PHYLLIS MOEN, WOMEN'S Two ROLES: A CONTEMPORARY DILEMMA 62-66
(1992); Presser, supra note 111, at 133-48. The author argues that, although a ma-
jority of married women now work outside the home, many of whom are mothers,
the distribution of labor within the home has shifted very little; women continue to
do the vast majority of all household labor, especially labor that is child-related.
113. See SCOTT COLTRANE, GENDER AND FAMILIES 153-54 (1998); Carol Smart, The
Legal and Moral Ordering of Child Custody, 18 J.L. & Soc'Y 485, 498 (1991);
Leighton E. Stamps et al., Judges' Beliefi Dealing with Child Custody Decisions, in
CHILD CUSTODY: LEGAL DECISIONS AND FAMILY OUTCOMES 3-16 (1997).
114. See WEITZMAN, supra note 12, at x (stating that California was at the forefront of
both the no fault divorce and the joint-custody movements).
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1980, the court in Perry v. Superior Court,115 pointing to a proffered
stipulation that the children were not "of the marriage," denied parental
status to a husband who had for many years acted as father to his wife's
children."6 Shortly after this decision, under intense lobbying by nu-
merous judges, the California legislature passed Family Code Section
4351.5 (hereinafter FCS 4351.5) allowing judges to apply both the ob-
ligations and the rights of parenthood to stepparents."'
This statute gave judges explicit jurisdiction to grant limited
parental rights (specifically visitation rights) to stepparents provided said
rights do not "conflict with any visitation ... right of a natural ...
parent who is not a party to the proceeding."". Unlike the Presumed
Father Statute that required judges to employ a presumption of
biological consanguinity, this law eliminated the need for the
presumption altogether. Under FCS 4351.5, judges can grant limited
parental rights without a finding of biological consanguinity (real or
imagined), provided the parent-child relationship is formed within the
institution of marriage.
This statute initiated several important changes in the field of child
custody. It instructed judges to grant visitation to former husbands who
acted like fathers to their wives' children, even in cases where the wives
strenuously objected."' This secved to level the playing field somewhat
between men and their former wives by elevating the importance of the
children' interests in the overall equation. While the estoppel holdings
allowed wives to prevent their husbands from financially deserting chil-
dren with whom they had formed a parent-like relationship, FCS
4351.5 allowed husbands to prevent their wives from severing the emo-
tional aspects of those relationships as well.
The enactment of FCS 4351.5 also opened a very narrowly con-
strued social route to parental status to a relatively small number of
women. For the first time women who were not biological mothers (but
who were married to men who were custodial fathers) could obtain
court-ordered visitation with children they had parented. In reality,
115. 166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (Ct. App. 1980).
116. Id. at 584-86. The justices noted that the stipulation removed the court's ability to
apply a presumption of biological consanguinity. Id. at 586 n.5. Just as important,
however, was the wife's objection to her husband's request for father status. Id. at
584-86.
117. The statute uses a gender-free definition of stepparent and is thus applicable to
women as well as men. CAL. FAM. CODE App. § 4351.5 (West 1994).
118. CAL. FAM. CODE App. § 4351.5(j) (West 1994).
119. Presumably the courts would not override objections grounded in legitimate concerns
for the child's safety.
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however, the rights women have gained through FCS 4351.5 are very
limited, especially when compared to the rights afforded men, first
through the Presumed Father Statute and later by the UPA. Although
women who have lived for some period of time with their husbands'
children can use FCS 4351.5 to insure post-divorce visitation with those
children, the language of the statute generally prevents judges from in-
terpreting the law in such a way as to award full parental status
(something all presumed fathers obtain) to these non-biological moth-
ers.' 20 Similarly, while the UPA continues to allow judges to replace
some undesirable and/or absent biological fathers with more highly de-
sirable and present social fathers, FCS 4351.5 does not extend this
ability in the direction of women. Under FCS 4351.5 judges may grant
stepmothers limited visitation, but only in ways that do not interfere
with the rights of either of the biological parents.
Finally, the application of FCS 4351.5 is restricted to the institu-
tion of marriage; it only applies to stepparents. This severely limits the
scope of the law in ways that exclude social mothers who co-parent chil-
dren in non-traditional families. As I will demonstrate in the next series
of cases, many non-biological mothers lose contact with children they
have parented-regardless of the quality, duration, or importance of
those relationships-because the law continues to severely limit a
judge's ability to recognize non-biological mothers as legitimate parents.
In the last decade of the twentieth century California's high courts
considered seven lesbian co-mother custody cases and several additional
heterosexual co-mother custody cases. Each case challenged the courts'
traditional legal constructions of motherhood. As with the cases above,
the mothers in these cases invited the courts to expand traditional no-
tions of parenthood for the purpose of tying children to adults who had
voluntarily accepted them into their families and assumed the role of
parent. What the analysis below reveals, however, is that when social
parents are female they directly (although often inadvertently) challenge
many of the assumptions fundamental to legal constructions of mother-
hood and family. When this occurs judges frequently respond by
narrowly constructing parenthood in ways that preserve traditional con-
structions of motherhood and family.
Curiale: Curiale v. Reagan2' began as a request for visitation made
by a lesbian woman who had co-parented her former partner's biologi-
cal child during the course of their intimate relationship. Angela
120. CAL. FAM. CODE App. § 4351.5 (West 1994).
121. 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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Reagan, the child's biological mother, and Robin Curiale began living
together in an intimate and exclusive relationship in 1982. Two years
into the relationship the couple, wishing to jointly parent a child, ac-
quired a donation of sperm that they used to impregnate Robin by
means of artificial insemination. In June of 1985, Robin delivered a
child, and for the next three years Angela co-parented the child while
acting as the family's sole financial provider. In December of 1987,
Robin and Angela ended their relationship and Angela left the family
home.
Following their breakup, the women voluntarily entered into a
written agreement that included joint physical custody of the child. Six
months after their breakup, however, Robin unilaterally severed the co-
parenting agreement and forbade Angela further contact with the child.
Angela responded by filing a complaint with the court seeking recogni-
tion as the child's de facto parent and reinstatement of the agreed upon
visitation schedule.
In court Angela argued that she should be legally recognized as a de
facto parent because she and Robin clearly expressed their intention to
co-parent, and because the child recognized her as a parent. The court,
however, responded that there existed "no statutory basis for plaintiffs
claim of parental status." 22 The court affirmed the trial court's decision
that the plaintiff lacked standing and that it was without jurisdiction to
award her either custody or visitation.
This case follows Halpern in that the biological mothers in both
cases resisted their former partners' attempts to obtain parental status.
Unlike Halpern, however, the child in Curiale was approximately two
and a half years old at the time the adult relationship was terminated.
This would appear to situate the case within the window of opportunity
outlined in Halpern. In other words, the child was old enough to recog-
nize Angela as her mother, but not old enough to understand that,
biologically speaking, she could have only one mother. Thus, the pre-
sumption of parenthood upon which the courts in both Valle and
Johnson relied is apparently available here. Despite the availability of this
child-based presumption, however, the court declined to even consider
the possibility that a child could have two mothers, a proposition that
clearly violated traditional constructions of family.
Nancy S.: In Nancy S. v. Michele G.123 the co-parents, Nancy and
Michele, began living together in August of 1969, and two months later
122. Id. at 521-22.
123. 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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they held a private "marriage ceremony." In 1979, they secured a dona-
tion of sperm that Michele used to impregnate Nancy via artificial
insemination. In June of 1980, Nancy gave birth to the couple's first
child. Several years later, repeating the procedure, they added a second
child to their family. Michele was listed on both children's birth certifi-
cates as their father,' and both children were given her family name. By
all accounts, both women held the children out publicly as their own
and together they functioned as loving and involved parents.
In January of 1985, the couple separated and began sharing cus-
tody of the children. Following a jointly agreed upon visitation schedule
both children spent considerable time in both homes. After approxi-
mately three years, Nancy sought to change the visitation schedule.
Michele, unhappy with Nancy's proposed changes and unable to broker
a compromise, turned to the courts for assistance.
To receive assistance from the courts, however, Michele had to gain
standing. To accomplish this, she needed the court to recognize her as
either a legal parent or a parental surrogate in whom they could invest
parental rights. To this end Michele proposed the court could: 1) rec-
ognize her as a de facto parent, 2) recognize that she stood in loco
parentis with regard to the children, 3) use equitable estoppel to prevent
Nancy from denying her parental relationship with the children, or 4)
recognize that she fits a "functional definition of parenthood."'25
For her first proposition, Michele drew from In re. B.G.' in which
the court had defined a de facto parent as one who, "on a day-to-day
basis, assumes the role of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's
physical needs and his psychological need for affection and care." 127 To
this argument the court responded, "These facts may well entitle appel-
lant to the status of a 'de facto' parent. It does not now, however, follow
that as a 'de facto' parent appellant has the same rights as a parent to
124. At this time California birth certificates had only two spaces for parents' names and
these were labeled "mother" and "father".
125. 1 obtained this information through an interview with Michele's attorney Amy Op-
penheimer conducted in Oakland CA in 1996 and by reviewing briefs submitted in
the case. See Appellant's Reply Brief to the Court of Appeal of the State of California
First Appellate District Division One and the Amici Curiae brief to the Court of Ap-
peal of the State of California First Appellate District Division One submitted by the
Gay and Lesbian Parents Coalition International, The San Francisco Bay Area Les-
bian/Gay Parenting Group, Carla A, Danielle H and Laurie F-H, and Ted W in
Support of Defendant/Appellant. These briefs are unpublished and on file with the
author.
126. 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974).
127. Id. at253 n.18.
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seek custody and visitation over the objection of the children's natural
mother."'28
In making a claim of in loco parentis Michele cited the decision in
Loomis v. State.129 In that case, the court ruled that:
a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful par-
ent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental
relationship, without going through the formalities necessary
to legal adoption, does stand in locus parentis, and the rights,
duties and liabilities of such person are the same as those of a
lawful parent. 130
In response, the appellate court noted that in the context of torts:
[T]he concept of in loco parentis has been used to impose
upon persons standing "in loco parentis" the same rights and
obligations imposed by statutory and common law upon par-
ents. It has also been applied to confer certain benefits upon a
child, such as more favorable inheritance tax treatment, or
workers' compensation benefits. The concept of "in loco par-
entis," however, has never been applied in a custody dispute to
give a nonparent the same rights as a parent ..."'
Clearly, courts have used the concept of in loco parentis at various
times to extend a variety of rights and benefits to children who would
otherwise be disadvantaged simply because the people acting as their
parents held no legal status as parents. The courts have determined that
it is generally acceptable and proper to recognize putative parents as le-
gal parents when doing so serves the best interest of children. It is hard
to imagine anything more important to a child then maintaining an
ongoing relationship with an adult who has acted as a primary parent
for five and nine years respectively. Nonetheless, despite the fact that
Michele was, by all accounts, an outstanding parent, the court declined
to protect those parent-child relationships by extending parental status
to her.
Interestingly, the court did mention that FCS 4351.5 allows judges
to grant visitation to stepparents within the context of divorce settle-
128. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
129. 39 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
130. Loomis, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (citation omitted).
131. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (citations omitted).
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ments.'13 2 The court, however, declined to apply the law to this case, ar-
guing that because Michele and Nancy's marriage was not legal in
California, they remained outside the scope of the law.133 Although
theoretically the court could have set aside the marriage requirement
arguing that its unavailability made it unenforceable with regard to les-
bian and gay couples, it chose instead to argue that the law simply did
not apply to lesbian and gay couples.
3 4
In support of her equitable estoppel claim, Michele argued, in part,
that "the children developed the deep psychological bonds of a parent-
child relationship" with her based on Nancy's insistence that they were
"equal parents both legally and functionally."'' 3  The court, however,
declined to apply equitable estoppel to the case for two reasons. First,
they argued that although estoppel has been used "for the purpose of
imposing support obligations on a husband ... [it] has never been in-
voked in California against a natural parent for the purpose of awarding
custody and visitation to a nonparent.' ' 136 Second, the court noted that:
[While] [o]ther states ... have begun to use the doctrine ...
to prevent a wife from denying the paternity of her husband
.... even where ... tests had excluded the husband as the
natural father .... [T]he use of the doctrine ... is rooted in
"[o]ne of the strongest presumptions in law [i.e.] that a child
born to a married woman is the legitimate child of her hus-
band.'1
3 7
As the court aptly noted, "[n]o similar presumption applies in this
,,138
case.
132. Id. at 217.
133. Court records show that Michele and Nancy had participated in a private marriage
ceremony and did at one time consider themselves to be a married couple. Id. at 214.
The State of California, however, does not recognize the marriages of same-sex cou-
ples. For a discussion of the State's denial of marriage benefits to same-sex couples
and how it affects the issues discussed here, see infra Part V.
134. Recall that in Blythe, for example, the court maneuvered around the requirement that
a biological father accept his child into his home and treat it as if it were legitimate. It
did so by arguing that Mr. Blythe, a single man, had no home into which to accept
his child and thus could not be held accountable to that particular requirement. Set-
ting the requirement aside, the court proceeded to grant Mr. Blythe parental status
retroactively. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
135. Appellant's Reply Brief 10-11 (Sept. 2, 1990) (unpublished, on file with the author).
136. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18 (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 218 (citations omitted).
138. Id.
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These arguments, however, strip the estoppel claim of its intent as
originally spelled out in Valle and later reiterated in Johnson. In those
cases the justices asserted that equitable estoppel could be used to assist
the courts in maintaining parent-child relationships, provided it was
determined that a child had developed a parent-child relationship with a
person they believed to be their natural parent. In neither case was the
social father married to the biological mother at the time the children
were born, so technically, neither father fell under the scope of existing
family law. This is precisely the reason the courts turned to equitable
estoppel in the first place.
The court in Nancy S., however, refused to make this shift. Al-
though the evidence indicated that the children had developed a parent-
child relationship with Michele and that a continuation of this relation-
ship was important to their psychological well-being, the court declined
to cite this evidence and use it as a basis for its decision.139 Instead, the
court employed a narrow interpretation of existing family law statutes,
effectively ruling that the law of Valle and Johnson does not apply to
women.
One plausible explanation for the court's refusal to support Mich-
ele's estoppel claim lies in the fact that Michele, as the co-mother of
slightly older children, disrupted the legal fiction normally used to sup-
port the equitable estoppel claim. In other words, by the ages of four
and eight, the children theoretically could have known enough about
reproduction to understand that only one of their mothers could be a
"natural" parent. If the legal fiction used to support the estoppel argu-
ment rests upon what the children believe regarding their biological
parentage at the time of the trial, it would cease to function as soon as
the children were old enough to understand the biological particulars of
human reproduction.
If we compare the facts in Valle to the facts in Nancy S., however,
we find that in the first instance the children were one and five years old
when they were transferred from their biological parents in Mexico to
their aunt and uncle in California. At the time of the divorce they were
nine and fourteen years old. The court in that case readily assumed that
the eldest child, at five years old, would not have distinguished between
his biological parents and his aunt and uncle, an assumption that
stretches the imagination under any conditions. Likewise, they appear
139. There was considerable evidence presented at trial supporting Michele's claim that
removing her from the children's lives would be psychologically harmful to them. Id.
at 215 n.4.
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ready to assume that this child never spoke with his younger brother
about their life in Mexico or the existence of their biological parents,
again a stretch. The children in Nancy S., by comparison, were born
into Nancy and Michele's family and it was the only family they had
ever known. Within that family both Nancy and Michele referred to
themselves and each other as "mother," and they encouraged the chil-
dren to do so as well. At the time of separation these children were one
and four years old and at trial they were four and eight years old.
It is arguable that if a presumption existed in Valle at the time of
trial (based on what the youngest child believed), it must also have ex-
isted in Nancy S. (again, based on the beliefs of the youngest child).
That the former court declared the presumption valid while the latter
court specifically declared it invalid indicates that there may exist addi-
tional tacit assumptions regarding the use of the presumption. In Valle,
the court was asked to secure the financial future of the children by us-
ing the presumption to legally tie the children to their non-biological
father and then ordering him to pay child support. That the court had
to broaden the legal definition of father to accomplish this goal appears
to be of little concern, and indeed doing so fit neatly into already exist-
ing legal trends. In Nancy S., however, the court was asked to secure the
future emotional well-being of the children by using the presumption to
legally tie the children to their non-biological mother and order her
former partner to allow visitation. That the legal definition of mother-
hood would have needed to have been broadened to accomplish this
goal appears to have disturbed the court, and indeed, doing so would
have strayed from existing legal trends. Unlike in the previous father
status cases where legal constructions of parenthood had been treated as
malleable and readily manipulated in the service of other goals, in this
case, the legal construction of parent-specifically mother-was treated
as sacrosanct and defending it became the goal.
Finally, Michele urged the court to adopt "a 'functional' definition
of parenthood in order to protect on-going relationships between chil-
dren and those who function as their parents. '' O Michele argued that a
"functional" parent would include "anyone who maintains a functional
parental relationship with a child when a legally recognized parent cre-
ated that relationship with the intent that the relationship be parental in
nature."'' The court rejected Michele's arguments, claiming that "ex-
panding the definition of a 'parent' in the manner advocated by
140. Id. at 219.
141. Appellant's Reply Brief to the Appellate Court, supra note 125, at 12-13.
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appellant could expose other natural parents to litigation brought by
child-care providers of long standing, relatives, successive sets of step-
parents or other close friends of the family.'
4 2
The court's claim, however, completely ignores the history of fa-
ther status cases recounted above in which the courts have in fact
increasingly expanded the definition of natural parent in the very ways
suggested by Michele. That the courts have consciously limited this ex-
pansion to men begs the question: under what conditions is sex-based
discrimination justifiable?
The key to the numerous contradictions raised in Nancy S. lies in
the fact that the category "parent," as it is constructed under California
law, has never been sex neutral. As Nancy S. makes clear, father and
mother are not interchangeable parental categories even when biological
reproduction is removed from the equation, i.e., when the courts are
asked to assign parental status to non-biological parents."'
Gayden:144 In 1991, the same appellate court heard an appeal
brought by a father who had been ordered to share custody (specifically
visitation) of his biological child with a former girlfriend. In this case, a
custodial biological father and his girlfriend, not the child's biological
mother, lived together for some period of time (the exact time is in dis-
pute, but ranged from somewhere between six months and a little over
one year). According to the girlfriend, during that time the child's bio-
logical mother had little or no contact with the child, leaving the
husband's girlfriend to assume the role of mother, which she did. For
approximately two years following their separation, which occurred
when the child was twenty-one months old, the non-biological mother
continued to visit the child on a regular basis and occasionally kept the
child overnight in her home.'45
The trial court granted the non-biological mother visitation, citing
the parent-like relationship she had developed and maintained with the
child. The appellate court, however, reversed, holding:
[E]xcept where the legislature has otherwise specifically pro-
vided elsewhere in the Family Law Act, visitation rights
142. NancyS., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
143. For a somewhat different argument as to why the third party doctrine should not be
applied in lesbian co-mother custody cases, see Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and
the Third Sex: Child Custody and Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. Rev. 1377
(1994).
144. In re Marriage of Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
145. Id. at 863.
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regarding a minor child may not be granted to a non-parent
... over the joint opposition of parents having custody of the
child merely upon a finding that such an award will promote
the best interests of the child .... [V]isitation must not be al-
lowed unless it is clearly and convincingly shown that denial
of visitation would be detrimental to the child.'
Although the court denied visitation to this non-biological mother,
it appears to have opened the door for non-biological mothers in cases
to follow by arguing:
As strong as the rights of [biological] parents must be, there
may be instances in which a child would be significantly
harmed by completely terminating his or her relationship with
a person who has (1) lived with the child for a substantial por-
tion of the child's life; (2) been regularly involved in providing
day-to-day care, nurturance and guidance for the child appro-
priate to the child's stage of development; and (3) been
permitted by a biologic[al] parent to assume a parental role.
The needs of the child, which are the most important consid-
eration, may sometimes require that a visitation award be




It was, however, many years before a court elected to apply this
standard to other non-biological mothers. When it finally did, it set the
bar considerably higher than anything previously considered for non-
biological fathers.
Calvert: Johnson v. Calvert4 ' was the California Supreme Court's
first surrogacy case. It originated when Mark and Crispina Calvert, un-
able to reproduce a child themselves due to Crispina's prior
hysterectomy (which had removed her uterus but not her ovaries), en-
tered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with Anna Johnson. In
January of 1990, a zygote created from Mark's sperm and Crispina's egg
was medically implanted into Ms. Johnson's womb, successfully im-
pregnating Ms. Johnson. Soon thereafter, however, relations between
the Calverts and Ms. Johnson deteriorated and the Calverts filed a peti-
tion with the court "seeking a declaration that they were the legal
146. Id. at 867.
147. Id. at 868.
148. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
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parents of the [as yet] unborn child." 49 Ms. Johnson responded by argu-
ing that she, and not Ms. Calvert, was in fact the child's legal mother.
Ms. Calvert's argument rested on the notion that biological con-
sanguinity is fundamental to legal constructions of natural parenthood.
Individuals, she argued, become parents through the act of genetic re-
production. She and Mr. Calvert are the child's rightful and legal
parents, she argued, because the child is their genetic offspring. 50
Ms. Johnson countered with the argument that gestation, and not
biological consanguinity, is in fact the central component of legal con-
structions of natural motherhood. During her nine-month pregnancy,
she argued, she and the child had become deeply emotionally bonded
with one another, a state unique to natural motherhood that neither of
the Calverts was able to achieve.
Although Ms. Johnson appears to have had precedent on her
side,"' the trial court rejected her claim arguing that, "Anna's relation-
ship to the child is analogous to that of a foster parent, providing care,
protection, and nurture [sic] during the period of time that the natural
mother, Crispina Calvert, was unable to care for the child ....
The trial court's decision is interesting because it appears to reverse
legal constructions of motherhood and fatherhood. Traditionally, courts
have recognized women who give birth to children as the legal mothers
of those children independent of any other familial relationships. Fa-
thers, on the other hand, are recognized as legal parents through the
familial relationship they develop with their child's mother. In fact, the
courts have justified differences in legal constructions of motherhood
and fatherhood by arguing that women develop an emotional bond
with their children during pregnancy while men do not.1 53 Indeed, nu-
merous courts, including the United States Supreme Court, 54 have
149. Id. at 778.
150. Id. at 779.
151. The U. S. Supreme Court, for example, has distinguished biological mothers from
biological fathers by arguing that women form a relationship with their children
while they are in utero, a condition men (and presumably others who do not gestate a
fetus) cannot possibly achieve. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972)
(Burger C.J., dissenting); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1978) (Stewart,
J., dissenting). This assertion operates tacitly in many of the cases discussed above as
well. See supra notes 37, 42 and accompanying text.
152. Valerie Hartouni, Breached Birth: Reflections on Race, Gender, and Reproductive Dis-
course in the 1980s, 2 CONFIGURATIONS 73, 81 (1994) (quoting the trial transcript).
153. See supra note 151.
154. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (Burger C.J., dissenting);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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argued that it is this special pre-birth relationship that pregnant women
form with their fetuses (along with subsequent strong and dependable
mothering behaviors this relationship theoretically fosters), and not bio-
logical consanguinity, that has made women who carry fetuses
indisputable parents. And it has traditionally been the theoretical exis-
tence of this unique relationship that has allowed the courts to treat
biological mothers and biological fathers differently from one another.
Indeed, biological fathers are routinely denied parental status based on
the idea that biology alone does not make one a parent. '
In a similar vein, Judge Parslow argued that maternal bonds "were
likely to occur ... only within the sanctity of a proper family unit
among 'married mothers with husbands whose babies they carry.'156
This statement also appears to have reversed legal constructions of
motherhood and fatherhood by treating Ms. Johnson more like a bio-
logical father-one whose relationship to a child is based on his place in
that child's family-than the birth mother she was.
Responding to an appeal filed by Ms. Johnson, Justice Sills ven-
tures even further along this path by arguing that:
There is not a single organic system of the human body not
influenced by an individual's underlying genetic makeup.
Genes determine the way physiological components of the
human body, such as the heart, liver, or blood vessels oper-
ate .... The fact that another person is, literally, developed
from a part of oneself can furnish the basis for a profound
psychological bond.'57
It is not clear why genetics suddenly became of paramount impor-
tance to the courts, especially considering their long history of
downplaying its importance in favor of other factors (the pre-birth
bonding experience for mothers and the marital relationship for fa-
thers). What is clear is that the courts have used this reasoning to
remove a child from its birth mother for the purpose of placing it with
its genetic parents.'58
155. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
156. Hartouni, supra note 152, at 81.
157. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 380-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
158. Dolgin, supra note 41, at 676 (arguing that the courts, faced with a choice between
placing the child with a single, poor, African-American mother and a married, middle
class, white/Filipino couple, delved into biology as a way of rationalizing their choice
of the Calverts over Ms. Johnson). See also Deborah R. Grayson, Mediating Intimacy.
2003]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
The Calvert case is unique because it represents the first time the
courts are faced with a claim to parental status that calls into question
the biological model the courts are accustomed to invoking when mak-
ing mother status decisions. When faced with competing claims to
mother status-both of which invoked a portion of the traditional
model of reproduction but neither of which conformed entirely to that
model-the courts chose the woman who, when joined with the child's
biological father, most closely approximated the traditional family.159
Moschetta: The appellate case In re Marriage ofMoschetta"6 ° was pre-
sented as a traditional surrogacy case that began when Robert and
Cynthia Moschetta hired a surrogate to be inseminated with Robert's161
sperm. The surrogate became pregnant, carried the fetus to term, and
then turned the child over to the Moschettas who began raising it as
their own. Six months later, however, the Moschetta's marriage deterio-
rated and Robert left the couple's home taking the child with him.
Cynthia, seeking a legal separation, petitioned the court to establish her-
self as the child's legal mother. Shortly thereafter, the surrogate mother
reentered the picture arguing that she, and not Cynthia, was in fact the
child's legal mother.
The trial court sided with the surrogate mother, declaring Robert
the child's legal father and the surrogate it's legal mother. It then or-
dered those two adults to share legal and physical custody of the child.
Robert appealed the decision, seeking to have Cynthia declared the
child's legal mother. In his appeal Robert argued that a gender-neutral
application of the Uniform Parentage Act would allow for the legal rec-
ognition of both presumptive fathers and presumptive mothers. Put
another way, by simply replacing the UPA'S gendered term "father"
with the gender-neutral term "parent" the courts could recognize wives,
like Cynthia, as presumed parents.
The appellate court declined to award Cynthia parental status
arguing that "in cases directly involving human reproduction,
individuals of different sexes may be distinguished on the basis of
Black Surrogate Mothers and the Law, 24 CRITICAL INQUIRY 525, 525-46 (1998);
Hartouni, supra note 152, at 73-88.
159. Although the California Supreme Court used a somewhat different rationale-
finding that Ms. Calvert was the legal mother because she intended to procreate the
child for the purpose of becoming its parent-it reached the same conclusion. John-
son, 851 P.2d at 782.
160. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
161. Cynthia Moshetta was sterile. Id. at 895.
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different reproductive roles. ' 1 62 In essence, the court argued, it is
reasonable to systematically exclude all women from the umbrella of
parental responsibilities and protections created by the Presumed Father
Statute and later the UPA because, after all, women become biological
mothers differently than men become biological fathers.
While the model of biological reproduction being invoked here
may be factually accurate-men and women do indeed become parents
through different biological processes-the relevance of the model re-
mains unclear. After all, the very purpose of the Presumed Father
Statute, and later the UPA, was to allow the courts to grant legal father
status to married men who are not the biological fathers of their wives'
children. To exclude all women from these statutes is to impose biologi-
cal reproduction on women in a way that it is not imposed on men.
Women become natural mothers only by carrying out an actual act of
biological reproduction, while men become natural fathers merely by
possessing the organs necessary to successfully carry out the act of bio-
logical reproduction.
The Moschetta court further argued that it could not grant Cynthia
presumed parental status because the Presumed Father Statute clearly
states that a man must be fertile and theoretically capable of impregnat-
ing his wife for the statute to be applicable. As was made clear by the
surrogacy agreement, Cynthia was in fact sterile and thus physically in-
capable of producing a child.
However, California Family Code section 7613 specifically pro-
tects the parental rights of sterile husbands by including them under the
Presumed Father Statute provided they support their wives' reproduc-
tive behavior. 163 As there is no question that Cynthia supported Robert's
reproductive behavior, a gender-neutral reading of that law would make
it applicable to Cynthia as well. If applied, it would have made Cyn-
thia's sterility irrelevant to her presumptive parenthood.
Finally, once again attempting to convince the court to embrace a
gender-neutral reading of the law, Robert argued:
162. Id. at 896 n.8.
163. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 1994) "If, under the supervision of a licensed phy-
sician and surgeon and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in
law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived." Furthermore, the
law states that, "The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon for
use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law
as if he were not the natural father of the child thereby conceived." CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7613(b) (West 1994).
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[B]ecause he and Cynthia took [the child] home from the
hospital and Cynthia afterwards held the child out as her own,
Cynthia should be presumed to be the natural mother because
she "received" the child into her home. Therefore, just as
Robert's "receiving" [the child] into his home would establish
that he was the presumed father, Cynthia's "receiving" [the
child] into her home made Cynthia the child's presumed
mother. 164
To this assertion the court responded, "[o]n the simplest level, the
argument is unpersuasive because Cynthia never held [the child] out as
her 'natural' child. There never was any doubt that [the child] has no
biological, natural or genetic connection with Cynthia. 1 65 In short, the
court argued that Cynthia, as a non-biological mother, simply did not
have the capacity to effectively mimic the role of the biological mother.
To fully unpack this argument we must begin by dividing the legal
construction of parenthood into its corresponding domains: mother-
hood and fatherhood. Both constructions begin with the reproductive
equation in which men and women play distinctly different roles. The
male role is generally brief in duration and hidden from public view-it
consists of the male's ejaculation of sperm, most often directly into a
woman's vagina, and usually in private.166 The female role, on the other
hand, occurs over a much longer period of time and is considerably
more visible. While the initial act of conception often occurs in private,
the gestation of a fetus creates changes in the body that make most
pregnancies highly visible. Pregnancies culminate in the physical act of
giving birth, an act that is also frequently witnessed by others, including
medical professionals, family members, and close friends. Finally, many
biological mothers breast-feed their infants for a period of time follow-
ing the birth, an act of mothering that publicly reinforces the biological
connection between the mother and infant.
In arguing that "[t]here never was any doubt that [the child] has no
biological, natural or genetic connection with Cynthia", the court in-
voked this biological model of reproduction as the standard against
which it measured Cynthia's acts of motherhood. In other words, the
court asked the question, "[h]as the parent before us adequately per-
164. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897 (footnote omitted).
165. Id.
166. Of course, today, some men become biological fathers by ejaculating into a cup
which is then turned over to a doctor who introduces the specimen directly into a
women's vagina, uterus, or even a test-tube, where it is united with an egg.
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formed his or her sex-based role in the reproductive scenario?" This is a
very slippery question, however, because the courts in presumed parent
cases are not dealing with biological parents. In most presumed parent
cases the courts are dealing with non-biological parents. This basic fact
fundamentally changes the equation. While the courts attempt to frame
their discussions in biological terms, in reality they are talking about
gendered behavior. What they are really asking is, "[h]as the parent be-
fore us performed their parenting duties in a gender-appropriate way?"
If the answer to this question is yes, the court assigns parental status and
if the answer is no, it rebuffs claims to parental status.
For men, an affirmative answer to this question generally requires
little more than a judge who is able to imagine that the alleged father
successfully completed an act of sexual intercourse with his wife around
the time of conception. Indeed, as the decisions in both Valle and John-
son made clear, the presumption is all about men's ability to mimic the
male reproductive role, not actual biological reproduction.
For women to obtain parental status when measured against this
model, however, the court must go much further. In addition to imag-
ining that a woman successfully completed an act of sexual intercourse
with her husband around the time of conception, judges must imagine
that she carried the fetus for roughly nine months, that she gave birth,
and even possibly that she was capable of breast-feeding the infant fol-
lowing the birth. This, according to the Moschetta court, is simply too
much to imagine.
The obvious problem with this model is that it divides social par-
ents (individuals who by definition have not biologically reproduced the
children they are raising) into distinctly different groups based on their
reproductive organs, i.e., by sex. The standard against which social fa-
thers and social mothers are measured is sex-based even though their
parenting behavior is not sex specific. The result is that one group has
access to socially constructed advantages that the other does not.
These cases make clear that a complicated relationship exists
between an alleged parent's sex (the physical reproductive organs s/he
possesses and the related reproductive role to which they are assigned by
nature), his/her gender (the social role of mother or father assigned to
men and women by society), and parental status (the likelihood a court
will assign a social parent legal parental status). Men who become social
fathers are significantly more likely than women who become social
mothers to be declared legal parents. This fact is underlined by the
Moschetta court's assertion that the laws used to justify the assignment of
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natural father status to non-biological fathers are "rooted in the old law
of illegitimacy" and therefore not applicable to women.
16
1
V. UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF MARRI'AGE IN
PARENTAL STATUS DECISIONS
Historically, family law in the United States has been derived using
the natural law assumption that the right of individuals to raise their
biological offspring exists independently of any governmental law or
regulation."' This right, proponents claim, is pre-political-a condition
"the law presupposes rather than creates.' 169 Relying upon this assump-
tion, courts have ruled that, "[u]nless parents are left free to raise their
own children, the entire social fabric will be destroyed: 'man' will be
'denaturalized,' the 'instincts of humanity stifled, and one of the strong-
est incentives to the propagation and continuance of the human race
destroyed.", 17° Through statements of this sort, courts historically have
constructed a system of family recognition that assumes biological con-
171
sanguinity.
This assumption is fundamental to early constructions of both ret-
roactive legitimation and presumed fatherhood. Retroactive legitimation
allowed courts to recognize and support biological relationships that
existed between unmarried fathers and their natural children, while early
presumptions of fatherhood required at least an assumption that a hus-
band was the biological father of his wife's child(ren) . 72
Judith Butler argues, however, that the origin story of the
biologically-based family, built as it is upon an "authoritative account
about an irrecoverable past, makes the constitution of the law appear as
167. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897.
168. Bartlett, supra note 22, at 887-88 (citations omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 887.
171. It is important to note, however, that despite the apparently all-encompassing nature
of judicial constructions of the traditional family, in practice, the putatively natural
rights of biological parents have often been abrogated, as for example in state laws
that denied these rights to slaves, see FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 24, at 53-161
and court decisions that have denied custody to lesbian and gay parents, see supra
note 25. Indeed, the very existence of these counterexamples illuminate how the law
is used to construct some parental relationships as "natural" while maintaining others
as either unnatural or nonexistent.
172. It is worth noting, however, that both the presumption of biological consanguinity
and marriage have recently been removed from the equation in some instances. See
supra note 109.
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a historical inevitability."'73 The utility of this particular origin story is
that it creates a legal fiction that separates the origin of the traditional
nuclear family from that of all other family types, constructing the
traditional nuclear family as the only natural family type. In doing so, it
legitimizes the legal oversight of "artificial" families, allowing the
legislature to strictly control the types of families that are created. 7
Building on these natural law assumptions, state legislatures, in-
cluding California's, have constructed the institution of marriage in
ways that specifically strengthen the ideological melding of marriage and
biological reproduction. For example, marriage becomes legally avail-
able around the same time that human reproduction becomes
biologically possible. Marriage legally joins two presumably fertile adults
(always one male and one female) to each other, preferably before, but,
when necessary, after, the propagation of children begins.'75 Indeed,
marriage laws provide male/female couples with a relatively fast, easy,
and cheap means of forming a legally recognizable family unit. While
only heterosexual (theoretically monogamous) couples may marry, those
who do so gain access to a myriad of public and private benefits de-
signed to support "legitimate" families in our society.
176
As courts in Hawaii and Vermont have recently determined, how-
ever, legal constructions of marriage that preclude same-sex couples
promote sex-based discrimination.' 7  To create laws that allow men to
form legally recognizable families with women, while preventing
173. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY,
36 (1990).
174. It also supports state and federal sanctioning of the traditional nuclear family, which
facilitates its location at the top of a governmentally-promoted hierarchy of family
types.
175. Early polygamy laws provide an example of marital unions that, while not limited to
one man and one woman, still use biological reproduction as their basis. While a man
could marry multiple wives, he could not marry another man nor could his wives
marry each other.
176. According to the U. S. General Accounting Office, in 1997 the federal government
alone maintained literally hundreds of laws designed to funnel a wide range of finan-
cial benefits directly to families formed through marriage. The federal government
privileges married couples regarding Social Security benefits; housing and food
stamps; veteran's benefits; taxation; federal civilian and military service benefits; em-
ployment benefits; immigration and naturalization; trade, commerce, and intellectual
property; financial disclosure and conflict of interest; crimes and family violence;
loans, guarantees, and payments in agriculture; federal natural resources; and Indian
affairs. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (GAO/OGC-
97-16) (1997).
177. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1999).
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women from forming legally recognizable families with other women or
men from forming legally recognizable families with other men, creates
a system that fundamentally discriminates on the basis of sex. It is, after
all, the sex of the individuals involved that holds the entire equation
together. To deny Jill the opportunity to marry Diane, while extending
that opportunity to Dennis simply because Jill is female and Dennis is
male, is to differentiate between Jill and Dennis on the basis of their sex.
If marriage laws are themselves discriminatory, all of the adjoining
laws that select married couples for preferential treatment are equally
suspect. A woman experiences sex-based discrimination when she is re-
fused the right to legally marry a same-sex partner, and this
discrimination is compounded if, based on this initial act of discrimina-
tion, she is then denied familial rights, responsibilities, and/or benefits
because she is not legally married. This is largely what is occurring in
lesbian co-mother custody cases. The California courts repeatedly refuse
to extend parental rights to lesbian non-biological mothers, citing the
fact that they never legally married the partners with whom they devel-
oped a co-parenting relationship.'78 The courts refuse them parental
rights arguing that they are ineligible for such rights because they failed
to establish their parent-child relationships within the context of legally
recognizable families.'"
As the analyses of the aforementioned surrogacy cases suggest,
however, this is only one piece of a larger story. 8 " As the decisions in
Calvert and Moschetta reveal, the institution of marriage itself is funda-
mentally gendered. Husbands, because they are male, access an
enhanced set of marriage-based rights and benefits compared to the
rights and benefits available to wives. Laws like the Presumed Father
Statute, the Retroactive Legitimation Statute and later the UPA, because
they are written and interpreted in sex-specific ways, fundamentally
gender the rights and benefits available to men and women through
marriage. Husbands, for example, may consent to the reproductive be-
havior of their spouses with the expectation that they will be recognized
as legal parents if and when their spouses successfully reproduce. Wives,
on the other hand, do not enjoy this legal right. Husbands may become
legal fathers simply by accepting children into their homes and treating
them as their own while no comparable means of achieving parental
status exists for wives. The State's desire to ideologically tie marriage to
178. See supra notes 121, 123 and accompanying text; infra notes 198, 206 and
accompanying text.
179. See id.
180. See supra notes 148, 160 and accompanying text.
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biological reproduction results in a sex-based system that discriminates
against non-biological mothers.
By combining these analyses we can begin to understand how the
gendered nature of the institution of marriage affects the parental rights
of all men and women, whether married or not. First, marriage divides
the adult population into two groups; those who live in legally recogniz-
able families, and those who do not. This division is extremely
important to adults and children living in two-parent families. Adults
who establish their parent-child relationships within the context of mar-
riage gain a level of recognition and protection for those parent-child
relationships that are largely unavailable to unmarried adults. Adults
excluded from marriage, such as those who choose to co-parent with
partners of the same sex, must utilize other legal avenues, if available, for
protecting their parent-child relationships. One such avenue is the sec-
ond parent adoption. 8' As previously noted, however, extra-marital
avenues for securing parent-child relationships are expensive and legally
tenuous and none carry all of the legal rights and protections available
through marriage.'82
But marriage itself further subdivides the adult population into two
groups: those who marry men (always women) and those who marry
women (always men). As demonstrated in the analyses above, individu-
als who marry women gain access to an enhanced set of parental rights,
responsibilities, and protections when compared to individuals who
marry men.
As a result, a hierarchical system for categorizing non-biological
parents has developed. Non-married (usually lesbian) non-biological
181. While some unmarried non-biological parents have been able to secure legal recogni-
tion of, and protection for, the relationships they form with their partners' children
through a procedure known as the second parent adoption, these adoptions are both
expensive and time consuming. Even in California, where these adoptions were first
pioneered over fifteen years ago, many judges refuse to grant them, arguing that their
legality remains suspect. See Susan E. Dalton, Protecting Our Parent-Child Relation-
ships: Understanding the Strengths and Weaknesses of Second-Parent Adoptions, in
QUEER FAMILIES QUEER POLITICS, CHALLENGING CULTURE AND THE STATE 201-20
(Mary Bernstein & Renate Reimann eds., 2001). The recent passage of Assembly Bill
25, effective January 2002, should make it easier for unmarried non-biological co-
parents to secure their parental rights by allowing them to secure legal adoptions us-
ing the stepparent adoption procedure. AssEMB. 25, 2001-02 Sess. (Cal. 2001).
182. Because the second parent adoption process is a judicial rather than a statutory crea-
tion, its legal viability is questionable. Indeed, in a recent appellate case the court
questioned the legal viability of all such adoptions. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court,
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), review granted, 39 P.3d 512 (Cal.
Jan. 29, 2002) (No. S102671).
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mothers exist at the bottom of the hierarchy. These non-biological par-
ents are frequently assigned/awarded no parental rights or
responsibilities. Married non-biological mothers exist in the middle of
the hierarchy. Through marriage, these non-biological parents achieve
an extremely limited set of parental rights. Married non-biological fa-
thers exist at the top of the hierarchy. Marriage for them frequently
carries an extended package of parental rights and responsibilities." 3 In
other words, the courts' assignment of parental status (and all of the
rights and responsibilities that adhere to that status) is based primarily
on an adult's position in this parenting hierarchy, a position that is
based on his/her sex and marital status.
VI. PLANTING SEEDS OF CHANGE
In addition to creating inequality between men and women, the
courts' sex-based application of the UPA uncritically ties legal construc-
tions of motherhood to traditional understandings of women as
mothers and traditional constructions of family. This becomes increas-
ingly apparent and burdensome as new reproductive scenarios and
imaginatively different family constellations emerge in today's society.
As the final analysis below reveals, a yawning precipice is developing
between the realities of family life and the parameters of family law. As
the cases in this section make clear, existing legal constructions of
mother and family, mired as they are in traditional constructions of
gender and sexuality, make it extremely difficult for judges to recognize
and support many of the parents and families that come before them.
This failure to recognize and support non-traditional parents and the
families they create renders the courts unable to adequately protect the
physical and emotional needs of children raised in these families.
Mental health professionals overwhelmingly argue that maintaining
the relationships children form with social parents (male or female) is
critically important to the future mental, emotional, and physical health
183. Gay non-biological fathers are excluded from this discussion because the California
courts have yet to hear a parental status case involving a gay non-biological father. For
a discussion of why gay men parent and co-parent at rates far lower than lesbian
women, see Susan E. Dalton, We are Family: Understanding the Structural Barriers
to the Legal Formation of Lesbian and Gay Families in California 300-02 (1999)
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara) (on file
with author).
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of children."" Even so, many judges concede that it remains extremely
difficult to legally recognize and support social mothers, especially when
these mothers are lesbian. Indeed, judges serious about protecting the
health and well-being of children raised in non-traditional families are
having to scramble to develop new ways of legally recognizing these
families and the parent-child relationship created within them.
Buzzanca: The appellate case Buzzanca v. Buzzanca'8 5 was initiated
by a wife seeking her husband's support of a child she obtained through
a gestational surrogacy agreement. In this case, a married couple, John
and Luanne Buzzanca arranged to have an embryo, genetically unrelated
to either of them, implanted in a surrogate. Following the implantation
procedure, but before the child's birth, Luanne and John separated. Af-
ter the child was born Luanne took custody and began raising it as her
own. When John filed for divorce, Luanne sought to have herself recog-
nized as the child's legal mother and John declared its legal father so
that the court would order John to pay child support.
John responded by noting that neither he nor Luanne was biologi-
cally related to the child nor had either legally adopted it. Therefore, he
argued, neither he nor Luanne was a legal parent and as a non-parent he
could not be held financially responsible for the child. If anything, he
concluded, the surrogate was the child's natural mother and her hus-
band was its presumed father. 6
The superior court ruled that the child had no legal parents. After
accepting a stipulation that neither the surrogate nor her husband were
the child's legal parents, it concluded that Luanne "could not be the
mother because she had neither contributed the egg nor given birth.
And John could not be the father, because, not having contributed the
sperm, he had no biological relationship with the child."'87 The appel-
late court, however, reversed, declaring both Luanne and John legal
188
parents.
This case is important because it represents the first published deci-
sion in California in which the courts recognize, as a legal parent, a
social mother who has no biological, physical, adoptive, or stepparent
184. See The Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc., Opinion of the Hawaii Circuit Court, First Cir-
cuit, 23 FAM. L.RP. 2001, 2003-09 (1996).
185. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
186. The surrogate mother strenuously opposed John's attempts to foist legal motherhood
upon her and requested, per their surrogacy agreement, that she and her husband be
released from the suit. Id. at 282.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 293.
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relationship to the child. How the court accomplishes this feat reveals
the many differences that continue to exist in current legal constructions
of mother and father status.
The appellate court began by chastising the superior court's failure
to consider the substantial and well-settled body of law holding that
there are times when fatherhood can be established by conduct apart
from giving birth or being genetically related to a child."'s' By modify-
ing elements of the UPA 9° and elements of the Artificial Insemination
Statute,191 and then combining the two, the court determined that it
could recognize John's parental status. While both statutes specifically
apply to married men whose wives give birth-a requirement that
would theoretically make them inapplicable here-the court, following
what has become something of a tradition, simply ignored this techni-
cality and attached parental status to John.1
9 2
The court then extended parental status to Luanne by arguing that
she and John together represented a marital unit to which parental
status may be attached. Here the court reasoned:
Just as a husband is deemed to be the lawful father of a child
unrelated to him when his wife gives birth after artificial in-
semination, so should a husband and wife be deemed the
lawful parents of a child after a surrogate bears a biologically
unrelated child on their behalf.... The only difference is that
in this case-unlike artificial insemination-there is no reason
to distinguish between husband and wife.19
As in previous cases, the driving social force in this case appears to
be the desire to secure the financial future of an otherwise fatherless
child by legally tying that child to the closest available father figure: a
male who had previously, by word or deed, agreed to assume the role of
father. What is new, however, is that the court devised a way to grant
parental status to a social mother. But there is a catch. John and
Luanne's parental statuses were legally constructed using somewhat
189. Id. at 282.
190. Specifically those parts relating to presumed fatherhood. Id. at 284.
191. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1994).
192. This was accomplished through a broad interpretation of the marital requirement.
Although the statutes are clearly intended to apply to married men whose wives give
birth, the court reinterpreted them as applicable to any married man who has con-
sented to the reproductive behavior of a woman for the purpose of producing a child
he intends to raise within his family. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286.
193. Id. at 282.
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different rationale. As a result, the ensuing mother and father statuses
remain hierarchically ordered. The court granted John parental status
based on the fact that he was married to Luanne and had consented to a
woman's reproductive behavior on his behalf. The court could have
stopped at this point because, as we have witnessed both here and in
Val,' 9' a man can be granted parental status independent of his wife.'95
Luanne's parental status, on the other hand, was dependent upon
John's parental status. What the court did was to identify a path
through which it could grant John parental status and then unite
Luanne, through her marriage, to John and move them down the path
to parental status as a singular unit. Luanne, the court argued, could be
granted parental status because she "is situated like a husband in an arti-
ficial insemination case."' 196 By merging Luanne with John in this way,
the court temporarily grants Luanne honorary male status allowing her
to side-step all the hurdles the law presently places in the way of non-
biological mothers.
It is important to note both the unusual parameters of this case and
the resulting restrictive nature of the decision, because both severely
limit the group of women to whom the decision is likely to be deemed
applicable in the future. The decision, for example, does nothing to al-
ter the language of existing statutes that continue to refer specifically to
men and husbands, nor does it alter the role assigned to mothers under
the statutes (mothers remain women who bear children). By recognizing
Luanne as "like a husband" instead of modifying the language of the
statutes to make them clearly applicable to women as women, the court
limits the decision to women who, with their husbands, enter into gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements.
Finally, the court itself distinguishes this decision from those ren-
dered in other non-biological mother cases (specifically lesbian mother
cases) by arguing:
[W]e are dealing with a man and woman who were married at
the time of conception and signing of the surrogacy agree-
ment, and we are reasoning from a statute, section 7613,
which contemplates parenthood on the part of a married man
without biological connection to the child born by his
wife.... It is enough to say that because the Nancy S. and
194. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
195. Recall that in Vall Manuel was declared a legal father although the court never ad-
dressed his wife's parental status. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
196. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288.
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[Z C. W] cases... involve[ed] non married couples at the time
of the artificial insemination, they are distinguishable.197
With that said, the court neatly retains traditional divisions be-
tween families created with and without the benefits of marriage as well
as gendered constructions of parent and family. The statement leaves
little doubt that the court did not intend to recognize or support non-
biological mothers who create parent-child relationships outside the
boundaries of traditional families.
Z C. W: In the appellate case In re Guardianship ofZ. C. W, "8 a les-
bian non-biological mother attempted to secure visitation with two
children she had helped raise within the context of a lesbian-headed
two-parent family. Cognizant of the courts' previous refusals to recog-
nize the parental status of non-biological mothers, she attempted to
sidestep the issue of motherhood entirely by framing her request as a
guardianship action.
This guardianship action was unique, however, because guardian-
ship actions traditionally seek a change of custody, i.e., that the children
be removed from the parent's home and placed with the guardian ("full
guardianship"). To support guardianship actions the courts generally
require proof that a failure to remove the child(ren) from the home of
the custodial parent(s) will result in physical, emotional or mental harm
to the child(ren).
In this case, however, the non-biological mother used the guardian-
ship action to seek visitation only. She did not argue that the biological
mother presented a danger to the children nor did she seek full custody
of the children. Instead, she argued that the children would be harmed
if their biological mother were allowed to unilaterally sever the parent-
child relationship that existed between her and the children.
The superior court responded by noting that while unusual, this
guardianship action appeared to represent the only means by which les-
bian non-biological parents in California might successfully seek court-
ordered contact with children with whom they have parent-like relation-
ships. Agreeing to hear the case as a "non-traditional" guardianship
action, the court then turned to the issue of detriment. Building on its
categorization of the case as "non-traditional", the court further deter-
mined that "a limited 'visitation guardianship' should be granted if it is
proven that a natural parent harms her children unnecessarily by deny-
197. Id. at 287 n.l 1.
198. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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ing them visitation with a meritorious de facto parent who is out of fa-
vor."
99
The court determined that while it might be willing to grant lim-
ited visitation to a "meritorious" de facto parent in a similar case, the
behavior of the non-biological mother in this case was not meritorious
enough to justify such a decision.200 Instead, the court determined that
the non-biological mother "was a de facto and psychological parent of
the children during the time she lived with respondent but that she sub-
sequently lost that status."2 Consequently, "the trial court denied the
petition for a guardianship, finding that there was no evidence of 'any
detriment of significance' to the children ...."'0'
On appeal the decision was affirmed. The court quoted the Curiale
opinion: "The Legislature has not conferred upon one in plaintiffs posi-
tion, a nonparent in a same-sex bilateral relationship, any right of
custody or visitation upon termination of the relationship. ,
203
While the non-biological mother in this case failed to gain court-
ordered visitation, she did succeed in convincing the trial court that
there exists legal grounds upon which a claim by a non-biological
mother may be heard. By situating herself as a legal guardian instead of
a legal parent, she successfully maneuvered around the restrictive defini-
tion of parent contained within the UPA and gained the right to be
recognized as a party able to bring suit.
204
Ironically, after strategically abandoning her claim to mother status
as a condition of having her case considered, the non-biological mother
was then required by the court to prove that she was not just a parent
but a super-parent in order to win the case. It is worth noting that very
few, if any, of the non-biological fathers discussed above would have
been deemed parents had their parenting behavior been evaluated using
this standard.2 5 Sadly, it may have been the very grounds upon which
199. Guardianship of Z.C.W. and K.G.W., County of Alameda No. 248043-1, 3-4 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1997).
200. Id. at 4.
201. In re Guardianship ofZ. CW, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50.
202. Id. The appellate court noted that it had been a full year since the last visit between
the non-biological mother and the children and that in that time the children had
apparently adjusted to her absence. Id. at 49.
203. Id. at 50 (quoting Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 520 (Ct. App. 1990)).
204. The appellate court attempted to pass the ball to the legislative branch, stating: "We
conclude that this issue is more appropriately addressed to the Legislature and that
appellant is not entitled to any relief here." Z C W, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49.
205. Indeed, recently in In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 934-35 (Cal. 2002), the Califor-
nia Supreme Court granted parental status to a man with several serious legal
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the non-biological mother gained the hearing-the fact that she was a
guardian and not a parent-that opened the door to the intense scrutiny
under which she eventually lost her right to continue parenting. Had
she been a legitimate parent in the eyes of the court, her legal rights as a
parent (including maintaining a relationship with her children) would
have far outweighed the less than meritorious behavior that occurred in
response to the biological mother's refusal to allow her visitation with
the children. Indeed, some of the very same behavior that hurt her, in-
cluding her surreptitious visits with the children and her insistence on
sending them letters and contacting them by telephone, would probably
have worked in her favor.
Olivia J: In the appellate case In re Guardianship of Olivia J.,206 the
trial court dismissed (without an evidentiary hearing) a claim of limited
guardianship filed by a lesbian non-biological mother who sought
court-ordered visitation with her former partner's biological child. 2°7 As
in ZC.W, the non-biological mother in this case argued that the bio-
logical mother's decision to sever the relationship between her and the
child was psychologically detrimental to the child.
Dismissing the case, the trial court reasoned that the non-biological
mother "is not a parent of the child and therefore, in the absence of an
allegation of abuse, neglect or abandonment, [she] could not, as a mat-
ter of law, establish that parental custody was detrimental to the
child."20 8 Despite noting that the non-biological mother could be a de
facto parent, the court concluded that "as a matter of law, the loss of the
minor's relationship with [the non-biological mother] 'is not the kind of
detriment which can provide the legal basis for a guardianship when the
guardianship is opposed by a parent.,, 209
Reversing this decision, the appellate court argued that a non-
biological mother can gain limited visitation if she successfully estab-
lishes that the "loss or termination of a child's relationship with [her is].
infractions against him including arrests for domestic violence (beating the child's
mother) and failure to complete a court-ordered anger management course. The
court noted that the non-biological father to whom they eventually assigned parental
status "was not a perfect candidate for fatherhood, if any such there be.... [t]he
strength of the presumption under section 7611 (d) does not depend on the presumed
father's being a paragon. What is dispositive is the presumed father's relationship
with, and responsibility for, the child." Id. at 935 n.2.
206. 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App 2000).
207. Id. at 366. The trial court determined that "it had no power to order visitation unless
a temporary or permanent guardian had been appointed." Id. (footnote omitted).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 367 (citation omitted).
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• . detrimental to the child."20 It noted, however, that "the right of par-
ents to retain custody ... is fundamental and may be disturbed '...
only in extreme cases of persons acting in a fashion incompatible with
parenthood.' 2 ' Reemphasizing the non-biological mother's status as a
nonparent, the court concluded that it is proper to gauge her parental
behavior using an exceptionally high standard.
The decisions in Z C. W and Olivia J create a quasi-parental status
for non-biological mothers who construct two-parent families with fe-
male partners, forming parent-child relationships with their partners'
biological children." 2 Because these mothers cannot marry their part-
ners, they are routinely classified as non-family members and thus non-
parents. As non-parents they are held to an exceptionally high standard
of parenting. If found to be truly exceptional parents, they are then
granted a limited right to ongoing visitation with the children for whom
they had been primary parents.
VII. CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis illustrates that women who form parenting
relationships with children to whom they are biologically unrelated are
treated differently under the law than are men who form parenting rela-
tionships with children to whom they are biologically unrelated. Men
who assume the role of parent for children living in their families are
frequently assigned parental status while women who assume the role of
parent for children living in their families are almost always denied pa-
rental status. To routinely assign men a status that is commonly denied
women under similar circumstances is to discriminate on the basis of
sex.
Sex-based discrimination in the assignment of parental status is not
the result of lawmakers' intent to unfairly disadvantage women in rela-
tion to men. It is, rather, the outgrowth of a century and a half of
legislative and judicial attempts to address sex- and gender-based dis-
parities that are the result of biological (sex) and socially constructed
(gender) differences in parenting. It is important to note, however, that
while sex-based differences in reproduction do exist, laws such as the
210. Id. at 368.
211. Id. at 368-69 (citations omitted).
212. I identify this categorization as "quasi-parenthood" because with the exception of on-
going contact it includes none of the usual rights and/or responsibilities of parent-
hood.
2003]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Presumed Father Statute, the Retroactive Legitimation Statute, and the
Uniform Parentage Act have primarily been used to mitigate gender-
based differences between men and women: the gendered division of
public and private life, the resulting unequal access to wealth, and the
gendered constructions of child-rearing.
Both the Presumed Father Statue and the Retroactive Legitimation
Statute were originally designed to secure fathers (read, financial bene-
factors) for children who would have otherwise suffered the deleterious
effects of illegitimacy (poverty and social stigmatization). They accom-
plished this goal by expanding the legal definition of fatherhood.
Following industrialization, women were increasingly relegated to
the private sphere of home and family, becoming closely identified with
the roles of wife, mother, and homemaker. At the same time, they were
increasingly excluded from meaningful participation within the public
sphere (politics and labor markets) and were frequently denied access to
most of the benefits available to persons who achieved success in those
realms (wealth, power, prestige, and status).
213
Men, on the other hand, became closely identified with the roles of
husband, father, and breadwinner. Men, increasingly tied to the public
sphere, used their positions therein to gain access to wealth, power, pres-
tige, and status.214 It became men's job to financially support wives and
children, and increasingly, the economic well-being of women and chil-
dren depended upon their familial relationships with men." 5
This gendered division of society into separate public and private
spheres made it extremely desirable to legally tie children to men both
willing and able to financially support them. In 1872, the California
legislature acted to facilitate this process by expanding the legal defini-
tion of natural fatherhood in two ways. First, it provided the legal
means to tie married non-biological fathers to their wives' children (the
Presumed Father Statute), and then it created a legal link between bio-
213. Women who gained some measure of wealth, power, prestige, and status usually did
so through their husbands. See generally RHODE, supra note 12, at 9-11; Brown, su-
pra note 12, at 242-43; Chused, supra note 12, at 153-219; Grossberg, supra note
12, at 286-311.
214. Admittedly not all men achieved wealth, power, prestige, and status in the public
realm. Indeed some, particularly non-white men, were specifically excluded from po-
sitions associated with the accumulation of these dividends. See OLIVER C. Cox,
CASTE, CLASS & RACE chapters 16 & 17 (1948). See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN
& ALFRED A. Moss, JR., FROM SLAVERv TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERI-
CANS (6th ed., 1988).
215. See supra note 213.
[Vol. 9:261
FROM PRESUMED FATHERS TO LESBIAN MOTHERS
logical fathers and the children they reproduced outside the context of
marriage (the Retroactive Legitimation Statute)."'
Over the next 100 years, however, social conditions changed con-
siderably, and these changes significantly altered the social construction
of parenthood. Women's labor force participation grew steadily
throughout the twentieth century.217 Women gained increasing access to
higher education."1 In 1964, the Civil Rights Act, which included pro-
visions for the equitable treatment of women in the labor force, became
the law of the land. 9 As women's labor force participation changed, so
too did their families. Notable changes included rising divorce and re-
marriage rates as well as an increasing tendency of unmarried women to
keep and raise their children.2
In the 1970s, the California courts encountered a series of divorce
cases in which wives (who were usually but not always biological
mothers)2 21 sought the courts' assistance in securing their children's
financial futures by legally tying their husbands (who were not the
children's biological fathers) to their children as legal fathers. The courts
responded to these requests by invoking the commercial concept of
equitable estoppel and then using it to further expand the legal
construction of fatherhood. This strategy allowed them to creatively
combine components of the Presumed Father Statute (a carefully re-
crafted presumption of fatherhood) with components of retroactive
legitimation (a man's acceptance of a child into his home and family)
for the purpose of assigning parental status to men who were
undeniably not the biological genitors of the children in question. As
with earlier expansions of fatherhood, this move allowed courts to
legally tie otherwise fatherless children to men who voluntarily assumed
the role of father, within the context of legitimate families, for the
purpose of securing children's financial well-being.
Throughout the 1980s, advances in reproductive technology, cou-
pled with increasingly lenient social control over sexuality, led to the
216. Biological fathers who reproduced outside of marriage were generally assigned father
status, provided that the women with whom they reproduced were not married and
living with their husband. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
217. RHODE, supra note 12, at 30; MARY P. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA: FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 253-54, 305 (3d ed. 1983).
218. RHODE, supra note 12, at 54 (noting that the number of college degrees granted to
women rose from "a postwar low of 25 percent to over 50 percent in the mid-
1980s .... ).
219. RHODE, supra note 12, at 56-57.
220. ANDREW J. CHERLIN, PUBLIC & PRIVATE FAMILIES (3d ed. 2002).
221. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
2003]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
emergence of several new familial formations. Included in these new
family groupings were two-parent lesbian-headed families and two-
parent heterosexual-headed families in which the traditional biological
connection between the mother and child had been technologically al-
tered-specifically through the use of contract surrogacy. As one might
expect, these changes eventually led to the creation of new forms of pa-
rental conflict. These new parental conflicts, often regarding the
parental status of non-biological/non-adoptive mothers, began entering
the California courts in the early 1990s.
These cases directly challenged the courts' reliance upon traditional
constructions of family and raised important questions regarding legal
constructions of parenthood and the well-being of children. At their
core was the question: Are non-biological mothers, who accept children
into their families and raise them as their own, comparable to non-
biological fathers who do the same? Phrased a slightly different way:
Should previous expansions of the legal construction of fatherhood also
apply to legal constructions of motherhood?
On a somewhat related issue, the courts were also asked to reexam-
ine their conceptualization of children's well-being, specifically as it is
measured through their ongoing relationships with parental figures.
Here the question before the courts was: Should children's emotional
well-being (secured through the preservation of their relationships with
parental figures who act as mothers) receive the same legal protection as
their financial well-being (secured through the preservation of their rela-
tionships with parental figures who act as fathers)?
Complicating these issues considerably are social and legal con-
structions of marriage, motherhood, and the nuclear family, all of which
artificially conflate biological reproduction and the social act of parent-
ing. Many legislators and judges, for example, falsely assume that
because biological reproduction requires and is limited to a male/female
pair, legal constructions of the family should (many argue must) be lim-
ited in the same way. This erroneous assumption serves to mask the
socially constructed nature of the legal family, casting the nuclear family
as a biological imperative and all other family forms as naturally/legally
suspect.
But as the above analyses reveal, it is actually the nuclear family
model, and not the biological parent-child relationships that theoreti-
cally support and define the standard, to which the courts are actually
committed. Indeed, it is their strong commitment to that model, cou-
pled with a somewhat malleable commitment to the biological nature of
certain parent-child relationships, existing both within and outside that
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model, that have allowed the courts to repeatedly expand the legal defi-
nition of fatherhood. What is troubling, however, is the courts'
willingness to characterize the biological nature of fatherhood as rela-
tively pliable, while simultaneously characterizing the biological nature
of motherhood as rigid and unyielding.
The logic supporting the resulting legal constructions of father-
hood and motherhood, constructions that are different in both kind and
effect and should thus raise a red flag with regard to sex-based discrimi-
nation, is artfully crafted using well-placed references to biological
reproduction. These repeated invocations, specifically referencing male
and female differences in reproduction, are used to establish the nuclear
family as "natural." This designation routinely invokes tacit assump-
tions regarding the biological nature of the relationships between the
parents and children living as a nuclear family, effectively masking the
fact that biological consanguinity is a necessary component of this fam-
ily model only some of the time.
It soon becomes apparent that assumptions of natural law, includ-
ing that families are created when men and women come together in
opposite sex pairs for the purpose of producing and raising biological
children, continue to strongly influence legal constructions of parent-
hood and family. Within this paradigm, women are more closely
identified with their bodies than are men. Mothers remain individuals
who experience a deep and otherwise unobtainable bond with their fe-
tuses/infants resulting in the natural awaking of a nurturing instinct.222
This nurturing/mothering instinct, so the story goes, is crucial to the
very survival of our society because it, in large part, insures the survival
of our children.
These assumptions, although largely tacit, provide the
rationalization for the legal construction of separate categories of
biological mother, biological and non-biological father, and non-
biological mother. Biological mothers are cast as women who gestate
and bond with fetuses/babies during reproduction and who are
primarily responsible for the emotional well-being of their children.
Biological and non-biological fathers alike are cast as individuals who
experience little or no "natural" emotional ties to children, although
they may develop such ties over time. Whether or not such a
relationship develops, however, these men, once they have voluntarily
222. Although, as we saw in Calvert, even this categorization of motherhood may be set
aside in favor of creating and maintaining a socially acceptable nuclear family. See su-
pra note 148 and accompanying text.
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assumed the role of father/financial provider, may be estopped from
abandoning that role. Like fathers, non-biological mothers are seen as
having no "natural" emotional relationship with the children that they
parent, although such a relationship may develop over time.
The fate of fathers and non-biological mothers diverge, however,
when courts are asked to recognize and preserve the relationships these
parents have forged with the children in their families. This is because,
unlike fathers, who are cast into a role that is complementary to the role
occupied by biological mothers (financial versus emotional caretaker),
non-biological mothers are always cast as competitors for the role prop-
erly occupied by biological mothers.2  In a nuclear family model, in
which parenting roles are tied to biological reproduction (families cor-
rectly contain one mother and one father), the mothering role is based
in large part on a biological awakening of the maternal instinct. Moth-
ers and fathers do different things (fathers are breadwinners while
mothers are emotional caretakers); there simply exists no space for non-
biological mothers. Whereas non-biological fathers are commonly seen
as acceptable replacements for missing biological fathers, non-biological
mothers (commonly cast as emotional caretakers rather than financial
providers) are not. Nor are non-biological mothers seen as reasonable
replacements for biological mothers. At best, lacking a biologically-
driven maternal instinct, non-biological mothers are seen as poor imita-
tions of the original.
This logic, of course, rests on a gendered division of the category
"parent," in which women are assigned the emotional and care-giving
labor while men are assigned the role of financial provider. In a society
in which both men and women emotionally care for children as well as
fill the role of financial provider, however, judges could logically begin
the process of uncoupling parenthood from gender. The resulting fam-
ily model would be one in which a missing parent of either sex is
replaceable with an existing parent of either sex, provided it can be
shown that the resulting parental dyad works to the benefit of the child.
Indeed, the parental equation only becomes rigid (irreducibly gendered)
when tied to biological reproduction.
Not incidentally, the courts continued commitment to the nuclear
family model has the effect of placing a child's economic well-being well
ahead of their emotional well-being in cases of family dissolution. The
223. To stick with the performance metaphor, non-biological mothers are cast as under-
studies to biological mothers, while fathers, both biological and non-biological, are
cast as co-stars.
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court's willingness to assign parental status to non-biological fathers, but
not non-biological mothers, means that they are frequently able to act
in ways that secure the financial well-being of children but not in ways
that secure the emotional well-being of children.
The problem today is that society has changed in ways that call
into question traditional constructions of parental roles, family forma-
tion, and even biological reproduction. Women, for the most part, are
no longer financially dependent upon men. This allows women to
change their male partners much more freely than in past generations, a
transformation that has rendered the traditional nuclear family largely
obsolete. Some women may even avoid men altogether, creating inti-
mate and familial relationships with other women.224
Indeed, changes in women's education and workforce participa-
tion, in addition to changing the ways many women and men structure
their families, are dramatically altering the roles women and men play
within families. It is relatively rare today to find a family in which the
husband is solely responsible for the family's financial well-being, while
his wife limits her activities to providing emotional care for her husband
and children. More commonly, wives and husbands split the provider
role. Indeed, many social scientists are now arguing that men, as well as
women, are expanding their parental roles. As women become financial
providers, some men are likewise taking on the role of emotional care-
takers.225
Families of today also take many different forms. In addition to the
11 226"traditional" nuclear family (which is now in the minority), many
children today live in stepparent and blended families,227 single-parent
families (most often headed by the mother), lesbian- and gay-headed
224. Some women purchase sperm directly from sperm banks allowing them to forego any
contact with a male sperm donor.
225. COLTRANE, supra note 113, at 96-105.
226. See Mary Jo Patterson, Single motherhood reported on the rise, THE STAR LEDGER, July
14, 1993, at 1 (finding that the proportion of families that meet the strict definition
of 'traditional'-married-couple families in which the husband works and the wife
does not-has plunged in recent years); see also CHERLIN, supra note 220, at 68-69
(arguing that the percentage of "traditional" nuclear families, as opposed to stepfami-
lies, blended families, single-parent families, lesbian- or gay-headed families, etc. is
now well below fifty percent).
227. Both stepparent families and blended families are created through marriages that
occur after the birth of at least one child between one of the child's biological/legal
parents and another adult who is biologically unrelated to the child. Stepparent fami-
lies are created when a parent marries a non-parent, while blended families are
created when two adults, both with children, marry each other, or two adults already
living in a stepfamily situation have a child themselves.
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families (single-and two-parent), 2 ' and multigenerational families (often
created when grandparents take over the raising of their grandchildren).
Each of these family forms contains their own unique constellation of
parental figures.
Complicating this picture further still, advances in reproductive
technologies have dramatically altered traditional understandings of the
relationships between biological consanguinity, the physical reproduc-
tion of children, and family formation. Today an individual or couple
can purchase an egg harvested from an unknown woman, have it joined
in a test-tube with sperm collected from an unknown man, and then
have the resulting gonad inserted into the womb of a surrogate mother.
Not too far in the future, if medical technology continues at its current
pace and along its present course, cloning will allow women to repro-
duce children without the use of sperm, removing men from the
reproductive equation entirely. The simple reality is that parenthood,
and in recent years specifically motherhood, is becoming increasingly
detached from strict notions of biological reproduction.
As our society moves further and further away from traditional
modes of reproduction and family formation, it becomes increasingly
troublesome to judge modern parents and the families they create
against a model that is hundreds of years old. While lawmakers have
generally recognized the problems inherent in this practice regarding the
legal constructions of fatherhood-and have thus updated these con-
structions over the years-they have consistently refused to do so with
regard to legal constructions of motherhood. The result is legal policy,
hopelessly mired in traditional notions of motherhood and family, that
unfairly works to the disadvantage of women. The defense of tradition
cannot justify legal policy when that policy results in the judicial prac-
tice of discrimination. :
228. Most of these families are created when lesbian or gay parents leave heterosexual
relationships and retain custody of' children produced during those relationships.
These parents may raise their children by themselves or join with a same-sex partner
who may or may not become the child's second parent. Increasingly, however, les-
bian- and gay-headed families are created when a same-sex couple decides to
introduce a child or children into their already existing same-sex relationship. If the
couple is female, they may use artificial insemination or if the couple is male they
may hire a surrogate. Both male and female couples may also use adoption to secure a
child.
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